af the Will over Senjation. j^.y^ 



vigour of foul, which enable it with greater 

 advantage to repel the fhootings of pain, and 

 the impulfes of appetite. Thus, love and joy, 

 leave behind them a fuccefllon of pleafurable 

 and fervent emotions, which, fettling into habit, 

 Hill continue to diminifli the influences of fenfe 

 upon the elaftic fpirit. 



In all thefe inftances, the power of the mind 

 over fenfation is, if at all, but imperfeflly 

 voluntary. The pafTions are often excited, with- 

 out the previous energy of the will. They rife 

 from fudden and unexpedled caufes. But 

 the queftion before us was principally intended 

 to afk — '' Whether the m.ind has a dire^ and 

 " immediate power of diminifhing fenfation, by 

 ^* its mere volition. Can it, by its own energy, 

 ^' fummon a degree of flrength and elafticity, 

 " which Ihall, in any meafure, lefTen the per« 

 " ception of fenfitive feeling!" 



Numerous inftances feem to prove the affirm- 

 ative. For how many perfons have, with the 

 full view of pain and fufTering before them, 

 refolved to brave their utmoft: rage; and, by 

 means of that refolution, have really fufFere^ 

 much lefs than they would otherwife have done ? 

 Hov/ many, who have enjoyed compofure and 

 calmnefs amidft the fcvcreft tortures ? The 

 examples of Mucius Scsvola, and of Portia, are 

 well known. In both, the mind feems to exert 

 f degree oi dire^ co^troul over the fenfe of pain, 



and 



