and Pajfwns] upon the Vnderjlandirtg. 3 81 
iubordination to the higher powers of reafoning 
and judgment. 
If the underftanding were that pure and Am¬ 
ple principle, which many reprefent it to be, 
entirely diftindt from all the paftions, and able 
to judge bejl of every truth, when molt feparate 
from their influence, we fhould not, furely, ob- 
ferve fo much diverfity of judgment, fuch ama¬ 
zing variety of opinions, upon almoft every 
fubjedt of human life. Wherever it is pojjible 
for human affections, interefts, or feelings to 
infinuate themfelves, we find a tinge of their 
nature, in the judgment. If we fuppofe the 
mind itjelf to judge, according to its nature and 
character, we fhall immediately perceive, that 
its fentence mujl be coloured and diverfified— 
that the judgment will fafhion itfelf to the ftate 
of the heart—and that, in almoft every infiance, 
a falfe tajle or feeling , will lead to falfe opinion, 
whether in poetry, painting, mufic, criticifm, 
oratory, or art in general. Is there not an 
almoft univerfal conformity between the feelings 
and the judgment ? Even vice itfelf in the pa- 
roxyfms of temptation, for a moment, feduces 
the underftanding, and blinds the reafon. At 
that moment, the finner promifes himfelf im¬ 
punity, and enjoyment. Nor is it, till the temp¬ 
tation is pajly that the mind fees again the de¬ 
formity and danger of vicious conduit. 
But, 
