On Dramatic Reprefentations. 97 
the means by which emotions are raifed are very 
various, yet that, when raifed, they are all precifely 
the fame in their nature, and only differ in degree 
of intenfity: This, I think, wiil manifeftly appear, 
if, in the firft place, the fame principle which is 
neceffary to account for the effect of one of thefe 
means, will equally account for all; and, in the 
fecond place, if the evident and external expreflions 
of our emotions are fimilar in every cafe. 
Why is it that the view of a real {cene of diftrefs, 
in which we are not perfonally concerned, operates 
upon our feelings, but in confequence.of that general 
principle of our nature, whereby the image of 
human paflions in another, excites correfponding 
emotions in ourfelves? Reality itfelf cannot operate 
upon us without a medium; and in what refpedct does 
the action produced by the dire& medium of the 
fenfes, differ from that produced by the remoter 
mediums of recollection,’ narration, or any mode 
of fictitious reprefentation? I behold a perfor 
fuffering under the extremity of torture, and find 
myfelf highly affected at the fpectacle. I make his 
feelings in fome refpect my own ;—my flefh creeps 
upon my bones, and the pain of fympathy rifes to 
fuch a degree as to become intoleiable. It is now 
ever, and that portion of human mifery has no 
Jonger an exiftence. Still the fcene recyrs to my 
mind, and whenever it intrudes, all my pain is 
Zenewed, though with lefs intenfity; and this con- 
tinues to be the cafe till the ideas fade away. The 
N identity 
