98 On Dramatic Reprefentations. 
identity of the fenfation is proved by the famenefs 
of the corporeal effects, If I fhuddered and turned 
pale at the real fpectacle, I do the fame at the firft © 
recollections: if I ran with horror from the former, 
I plunge into company or bufinefs to deliver me 
from the latter. Now, if it be allowed, that my 
own mind, acting upon itfelf, without the aid of 
external objects, be capable of creating an imaginary 
fcene indiftinguifhable in its effects from a real one, 
why fhould not equal power be granted to thofe 
artificial methods, in which refembling, fenfible 
objects are called in to affift the’ operations of the 
fancy ? ; 
But, it may be faid, no one denies as a matter of 
fact, the power of recollection and fictitious repre- 
fentation to move the paffions, and the queftion is 
only, what is neceffary to the production of this 
effe&? Now, fince in the cafe of a recollected fcene, 
it cannot be a belief of reality, (for no man_ believes 
that the event on which he reflects is acted over 
again) why fhould fuch belief have any thing more 
to do with the efficacy of fition? And this reafon- 
ing (on which Dr. Johnfon diffufely dwells) is juft, 
as far as it goes; but his error confifts in confounding 
with proper belief, that impreffion of reality, or temporary 
‘illufion, which I conceive abfolutely effential to 
‘account for the undoubted effects produced by all 
the various imitations of aétion. . Belief is the con- 
fequence ofa reflex operation of the mind, by which 
we are convinced of a truth after examination or 
enquiry. 
