1 2 An Inquiry into the Principles of Taxation. 



and forty-eight members were prefent, that the 

 influence of the crown hath increafedy is increajingy 

 and ought to be diminijhed. (b) And in the ftatute 

 of a fubfequent feffion of parliament, for regulating 

 the king's houfehold, it is enafted, that an oath be 

 taken by the keeper of his majefty's privy purfe, 

 that no part of it fhall be applied to the ufe of any 

 member of the houfe of commons. We are fur- 

 ther warranted, in our apprehenfions of the danger 

 arifing from this fource, by the authority of the 

 Baron de Montefquieu, who predids that the 

 liberties of England will perifh, whenever the 

 legiflative power fhall have become more corrupt 

 than the executive: or, as it fliould, perhaps, 

 have been expreffed, whenever the executive power 

 Ihall have acquired a corrupt afcendency over 

 the legiflative. In the reign of Charles II. if the 

 difpatches of Barillon may be credited, the king 

 of France meditated the eflablifhment of a pecu- 

 niary influence in the Englilh Parliament. It is 

 alfo well known that Charles was himfelf a pen- 

 fioner to this monarch, and received large fums 

 for the mofl illicit purpofes. When the crown 

 egregioufly abufes its power, the commons, on 

 various occafions, have thought themfelves juflifi- 

 able in withholding the fupplies. If they, however, 

 unhappily countenance and aid fuch abufes, and 

 remain deaf to petitions, remonftrances, and 

 every other conflitutional claim, the people may 

 continue to fubmit, but cannot deem themfelves 



morally 



