248 On the comparative Excellence 



creation ; a fubjed, yet, but flightly touched on, 

 though, highly deferving Off further inquiry. 

 That acls of injuftice may be, and too frequently 

 are exercifed upon them, cannot be doubted j 

 and if fo, the neceflity of fome regulations, in 

 this refpedl, is the immediate confequence of 

 fuch concefllon. A right of property, according 

 to the prefent fyftem of things, includes alfo 

 a right to torment, to mutilate, and to kill; 

 to weary out nature by repeated fufFerings ; or 

 to deftroy at once that vital fpark, the imme- 

 diate gift of the Divinity, which, when once 

 extinguiflied, no human power can reftore : but, 

 it is to be hoped, this may not arife fo much 

 from a ferocity and wanton propenfity to cruelty 

 in the human mind, as from a too prevalent 

 idea, that there are no mutual rights between 

 man and the brute creation ; abfolute property 

 being vefted in the one, and unlimited refig- 

 nation the lot of the other. To counteraft this 

 falfe and injurious opinion, neither moral in- 

 jundions, nor political regulations ftiould be 

 wanting ; nor can the powers of the mind be 

 more honourably exerted, than in preventing 

 the unneceffary extenfion of aftual pain in the 

 univerfe; or in pleading the caufe of that clafs 

 of beings, to whom nature, though fhe gave 

 capacity of pain, denied the power of remon- 

 itrating againft their fufferings. 



Thefe 



