49© On the Foundation of Civil Government. 



community, (c) Public tranfaftions do not re- 

 quire more than ordinary talents. A man of 

 common underftanding with the requifite ap- 

 plication to the neceffiiry ftudies, is as equal to 

 the public as to the private departments of life. 

 (d) This fcheme would introduce all the evils of 

 competition, (e) Connexions and riches would 

 perpetually interfere, fo as to render the choice 

 impradicable on the fole ground of ability. 

 (f) In a large community it would be impofTiblc 

 to determine who had the beft title on this fcore. 



Befide thefe I think no other fources of poli- 

 tical authority can be pointed out ; and as none 

 of thefe appear to furnifh fufficient ground for 

 the claim, but are all fubjedt to infuperable 

 objeftioiTs, I conclude, that the right of exerciftng 

 political powers whether about to commence or actually 

 ixijiing, is derived folely from the people. Of courfe, 

 wherever fuch power is exercifed, unlefs by 

 virtue of a compadl exprefs, or upon fufficient 

 ground implied, fuch exertion is tyranny. 



II. But the people {i. e. a multitude of indivi- 

 duals) can have no right to exercife power, 

 authority, or dominion over a fellow-creature, 

 in their colleftive capacity, except in thofe cafes 

 where they had fuch a right in their capacity of 

 individuals. The people is a term, exprefling an 

 aggregate of individuals; and the rights of the 

 people (previous to compa6l) are no other than 

 the aggref^ate of the rights belonging in common 



to 



