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ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MIND AND MUSCLE; 



(Being the tttbstance of a Paper read before the Philosophical and Literary Society of 

 Bristol, Dec. 1834.> 



BY J. A. SYMONDS, M. D. 



PART I. 



Muscles and their contractions have commonly been divided into 

 voluntary and involuntary; a distinction which involves many anomalies, 

 and may lead, and indeed has led to considerable confusion. The muscles 

 which are employed in the mere organic functions, have been placed in the 

 latter class, while those which subserve locomotion have been grouped in 

 the former. But it is well known that certain motions which are for the 

 most part independent of the will, have in some instances been subjected 

 to its controul, and on the other hand, that in a great number of those 

 which are designated voluntary, volition has very little concern, and that 

 every one of them might, under certain conditions of the system, be brought 

 into play in direct opposition to that principle ; so that the most that can 

 be said for this classification is, that it is based on the general fact, that 

 the one groupe act nearly always without any stimulus from the will, while 

 the others own this faculty, if faculty it be, as a very frequent instigator 

 to action. 



An arrangement less subject to exception, and adopted by many physi- 

 ologists, is that which distributes muscular motions into those which main- 

 tain the nutritive or vegetative life of the system, and those which enable 

 it to entertain relations with surrounding objects. On the latter, princi- 

 pallv, is it my intention to offer the following remarks, in which I shall 

 restrict myself to the consideration of the connection between tlie move- 

 ments in question, and certain mental phaenomena. 



The first inquiry that presents itself is, what is voluntary motion ? If 

 we apply to etymology, we shall only make out that it is motion related 

 with desire, wish, inclination, preference, &c. But as the word voluntary 

 has acquired a signification of more import than its root, we must not con- 

 tent ourselves with its derivation. When a person has desired an object, 

 and gained possession of it by means of certain muscular contractions, he 

 is said to have executed a voluntary movement. But what was the process? 

 Let us suppose that the object was a book upon the table before him. 

 After questioning his consciousness, he can enumerate no other events than 

 the wish to take up the book, the belief that the action will ensue, and the 

 movements of his hand and arm, which accomplished his wish and con- 

 firmed his expectation. This, however, may be considered so customary 

 and mechanical an action, as scarcely to present a fair example for educing 

 the operation of volition. Let us choose then a movement entirely new to 

 the individual. He wishes to pass a sword between two powerful magnets, 



