On the Relations between Mind and Muscle. 1 13 



which are in rather close proximity to each other ; he executes this difficult 

 manoeuvre ; and we ask, what have been the events in the process ? He 

 wished to hold the instrument fast, and his hand grasped the hilt ; he 

 wished to move it forward, and his arm was projected ; he wished to move 

 it in a line midway between the magnets, knowing that in that direction 

 their mutual antagonism would assist him in overcoming the attraction of 

 either one ; he felt on a deviation from this line a strong attraction, and he 

 wished to move the weapon in an opposite direction, but not so far as to 

 encounter a similar difficulty on the opposite side. His wishes were ac- 

 complished ; and he can give no additional information, if he merely scru- 

 tinizes his own consciousness. 



But this instance again may be objected to, on the ground that although 

 the general resultant action is new, yet the elementary movements are so 

 familiar, as not to have required the occurrence of volition. To select 

 then an example entirely free from any exception of this kind ; let us sup- 

 pose that the individual wishes to bend his arm; the flexion is effected j 

 and again we enquire, what were the events in the process ? It cannot 

 now be said that the action was not attended to, in consequence of the 

 mind being occupied with the ulterior object. The motion of the limb was 

 desired, and the motion took place j this is all that can be learned from 

 the agent. But it is the opinion of many philosophers that there was an 

 intermediate event, to wit, volition. They hold that to will and to wish, 

 imply separate states of mind; and they describe volition as a mental 

 attempt anterior to muscular motion, and subsequent to, and determined 

 by, desire. In other words, the agent first wishes, then wills, and then 

 acts. By what arguments is this view supported ? 



In the judgment of some persons, it may perhaps derive no little force 

 from tiie notion, that the will is something active and spontaneous, while 

 desire is altogether passive, and must consequently be a separate mental 

 condition. Now the idea of activity is said to have two sources ; the one 

 consisting in our observation of certain bodies which move without appa- 

 rently being operated upon by other bodies ; the other consisting in the 

 fact that we are unconscious of any external event that stands in the rela- 

 tion of cause to our own movements, or in other words, in our belief that 

 these movements are self-impelled. In each of these cases, the notion of 

 activity results from the non-appearance of any prior event ; in each we 

 take a limited scries of events, tlie first of which is viewed with reference 

 to those only tliat follow, and not to any preceding series. But surelv 

 the same notion of activity arises in our minds, whenever we view any 

 limited set of pliaenomena whatever; (for with our imperfect faculties we 

 are unable to survey the whole series up to the great First Cause.) Each 

 detached series has, by virtue of its detached circumstances, an initial 

 .•vent, which is active with relation to all the events that follow it. Thus 

 we say that an acid acta on a metal ; the acid is viewed only in its relation 



No. 2.— Vol. I. o 



