114 On the Relations between Mind and Mvscle. 



of antecedence, and has au active character j bnt how came the acid in 

 contact with the metal? It is now considered with reference to a series 

 of phienomena that have gone before, and immediately assumes a passive 

 aspect. The same holds good with every event that that we know of; it 

 is active as au antecedent, passive as a consequent. It is easy then to 

 understand why desire is generally considered as a passive emotion ; it is 

 because this feeling is contemplated in a series of events of which it is the 

 conclusion ; the series being, the presentation of the object, the perception 

 of the object, and the desire of the object. Volition, on the contrary, 

 obtains its active character from being viewed in relation to certain 

 movements which succeed it. But is it not possible to make these two 

 conditions (supposing them not to be identical,) exchange characters ? 

 Unquestionably; and simply by considering them in relation to each 

 jother; for desire has theu the priority of occurrence, and consequently is 

 active, while volition is necessarily passive. 



There does not appear then sufficient reason for denying the identity of 

 volition and desire, on the ground that the one has an active and the other 

 a passive quality. Let us endeavour to try the value of another argument- 

 There must certainly be an operation intermediate to desire and action, 

 it is urged, or to what can be attributed the feeling of effort? for surely 

 this is something different both from the wish, and from the action which 

 is the object of the wish. This is a proposition which requires a very close 

 scrutiny ; for if there really be a feeling of effijrt, sui generis, incapable of 

 resolution into desire or action, the question is at an end ; the feeling is 

 the tertium quid, the very volition whose existence we are discussing. In 

 order that we may better understand in what an effort consists, it will be 

 convenient to take one or two illustrations. A man wishes to snap a piece 

 of cord by which his hands are tied ; we see him separate them suddenly, 

 and the band is broken. In describing the action, and the mental condition 

 which preceded it, we should merely say that the man wished to break the 

 cord, and that he broke it. But if the first motion of the hands is not 

 followed by the rupture, we then say that he made an effort to that effect ; 

 but in what respect do the two cases differ ? The wish was the same, and 

 the muscular motion the same ; in tlie one case these events were followed 

 by the desired event, in the other they were not. To this it may perhaps 

 be answered, that there is in reality an effort, no less in the former tlian in 

 the latter instance, since it occurs before the muscular action, and conse- 

 quently is not dependent on the fulfilment or on the non-fulfilment of the 

 ulterior oiiject, and that it is oidy in common parlance that the use of the 

 word effort is confined to the unsuccessful series of events, it being lost 

 sight of in the other instance, or confounded with the action itself. To 

 avoid then any confusion of this kind, let us view the individual in the act 

 of straining the cord. Had we never seen a person so employed before, 

 and were we ignorant of the effects of tension on such a substance, we 



