On the Relations between Mind and Muscle. 1 1 7 



desire to another, and the determination of the action by the predominating 

 desire. The work just mentioned, renders it needless for us to dwell 

 longer upon the argument in question, and we shall therefore content our- 

 selves with a remark upon the common phrase, " to act against the will." 

 Will is here employed in the sense of desire ; this must be allowed by even 

 the most sturdy asserters of the separateness of will and desire. But as 

 the act implies a volition, or effort of the will proper, they must say that 

 an individual may will an act against his will. To our apprehension it 

 would be equally correct to say, that he desires an act against his desire ; in 

 other words, that one desire is opposed to, and predominant over the other. 

 When, therefore, we talk of acting against the will, we omit the mention 

 of the desire which determined the volition, and only intimate the opposi- 

 tion of the action itself to the first of the two desires. The following 

 example will perhaps exhibit this point in its true light. A school-boy is 

 aroused from his slumbers, and his happy dreams of hounds and horses, by 

 the dissonant clang of the matin bell. The first desire that arises in his 

 mind is to renew his repose, and the pursuit of his pleasing illusions j a 

 second emotion arises in the form of a desire to avoid some discipline, or 

 to obtain a prize for diligence and punctuality. If the first be the stronger, 

 he sinks back upon his pillow ; if the latter, he leaves his bed, and he says, 

 " against his will," in which phrase he specifies the vanquished desire, and 

 leaves the other to be inferred from the action which it has determined. 

 The continuance or return of the resisted motion does not argue against 

 this view; it is still a weaker emotion, notwithstanding the subject of it 

 may say that he would have much preferred remaining in bed ; for by this 

 he only means, that continuing in bed would have been more agreeable 

 than his present condition, while he neglects to mention the ulterior object, 

 the contemplation of which was the cause of his being where he is. 



Another objection to the identity of desire and volition, is founded upon 

 the assertion that the latter is conversant with our own acts only, while 

 the objects of the former are external to us. But this we consider to be 

 weaker ground than even either of the former positions. It is true that as 

 the words are used, we may desire the actions of a foreign bodv, but can 

 only uiH our own ; and if we set out with the assumption that volition and 

 desire are different faculties, this would appear a very natural character of 

 distinction. But the nature of the object does not alter the mental condi- 

 tion. Whether a red rose or a white rose be presented to the eye, the 

 mental state is still a vision ; and in like manner, whether a person wishes 

 a cloud to pass before the sun, or the motion of one of his limbs, the men- 

 tal state is in either case, desire. But if this be true, how is it, some one 

 may ask, that we give this particular instance of desire a specific designa- 

 tion, viz. will or volition, while all the other species possess only their 

 generic name ? We apprehend the reason to be simply this j that in the 

 former instance, the desire bears (he relation of cause to the subsequent 



