118 On the Relations between Mind and Muscle. 



action, while in the latter there is no such relation. The muscular move- 

 ment takes place, because it was desired ; our experience of the invariable 

 sequence of these two events, induces us to describe them as cause and 

 effect ; but the passage of the cloud over the sun, if it chanced to follow 

 our desire, we know full well was not the effect of the latter, because our 

 experience has often recognized the occurrence of these events without 

 a similar chain of sequence. 



Let us glance at one more objection contained in such a question as the 

 following, — "How are we to explain the case of a person who desires to 

 move his limb, but being convinced of the in^possibility of the action, does 

 not choose to exert his volition ?" In this query there is in the first place 

 an assumption that a person can desire what he believes to be impossible j 

 and secondly, it is overlooked that the desire of the movement must neces- 

 sarily induce, as we have shewn above, those initial or preparatory actions 

 which constitute an attempt, or volitional exertion. Can we entertain a 

 desire, though believing in the impossibility of gratifying it ? Certainly 

 not. To desire an object, and to feel that it would be very agreeable, if 

 possessed, are two very different states of mind. " I should like so and 

 so," has a very different signification from "I wish or desire so and so.'' 

 The former expression might be used by a sensible person with reference 

 to any thing physically impossible, such as a visit to the Dog-star j but 

 the latter applied to the same object would indicate undsoundness of mind. 

 The difficulty in relinquishing what is called a useless desire, depends on 

 the difficulty of believing that it is useless. A mind unhinged by the 

 wrench of a dreadful bereavement may long for the return of the dead, but 

 it is because that mind is incapable of considering the circumstances which 

 render tlie object of its desire impossible. A child both wishes and asks 

 for many impracticable delights, and the most effectual method of stopping 

 such desires is to convince him that they cannot be realized. A culprit 

 may be anxious for the release of his limbs from the stocks, but has no 

 desire to remove them himself, because he believes the action to be impos- 

 sible ; he consequently makes no efforts at extrication so long as he enter- 

 tains this belief, which efforts, however, would occur by necessity, if he 

 experienced any desire. To return to the case more immediately before 

 us; if the paralytic can be convinced that it is possible for him to move 

 his limbs, the corresponding desire immediately arises, and is followed 

 either by the movement in question, or by those respiratory actions which 

 constitute an effort. 



Thus far then in our inquiry we have been unable to discover any event 

 intermediate to the desire, and the occurrence of the muscular movement 

 which is its object. It has been seen, however, that the former stands in 

 the relation of cause to the latter ; which cannot be predicated of it in 

 connection with any other object. Volition then, or will, if we understand 

 it rightly, is an expression of this relation ; in other words, to will, in its 



