On the Relations between Mind and Muscle. 1 1 9 



strict sense, is to wish a muscular action. It is iu its character of cause, 

 that tlie word ivill is almost always applied to the desires of the Deity ; 

 because it is obviously impossible to conceive of any condition of the 

 Divine mind, which is not necessarily followed by the event which is its 

 object. In like manner, the inclination of a monarch in the affairs of his 

 kingdom, is often designated as his will, because the desired effect nearly 

 always follows. So ngain the wisli of an individual with regard to the 

 disposal of his property, being rendered more or less certain of execution 

 by the law of the land, is termed his will. When we say that our desires 

 have been gratified without the intervention of our will, we only express 

 circuitously that the occurrence of tlie desired event was not the e^'ect 

 of the desire. 



Before quitting this part of the subject, it may be remarked, tliat volition 

 is often supposed to be exercised in choice or preference ; but we trust 

 there is no need to point out that this is an improper application of a 

 term which belongs only to muscular action and its cause in the mind ; 

 choice, as we shall see presently, being nothing more than the strongest 

 of two or more desires, and having no necessary connection with action. 

 Intention, resolution, deterviination, &c. are only forms of the same mental 

 condition, the choice of some action or line of conduct, that may appear 

 more desirable than some other presented to our contemplation. Is there 

 no difference then between the phrases, " I wish to study Geology," and " I 

 intend, or have resolved, or have determined, to study Geology ?" Un- 

 questionably. In the former instance I express a wish, but by no means 

 intimate that it exceeds my inclination to stay at home, and attend to 

 pursuits that demand less corporeal exertion. In the latter, I declare that 

 my inclination to the study predominates over any opposing desire.* 



In considering the nature of resolution, we must be careful not to confound 

 it with volition, which so often occurs, though not necessarily, between the 

 resolution and its achievement. Our resolves are executed more or less by 

 muscular actions of some kind or other, whether by speaking, writing, 

 locomotion, &c. Volition we have said is the desire, whose object and 

 result is muscular movement; but as the latter may have other causes, 

 volition is not necessarily implied iu the execution of a desire. Thus I 

 may resolve and announce that I will fetch something from an adjoining 



• Tlie auxiliary "I will" intimates both wish and resolution, and in addition, 

 perhaps, a decided expectation of the future event — ■" I shall,'" expresses little more 

 than a prediction ; at all events it is improperly used if made to express inclination, 

 ■incc shall is derived from a Saxon word, signifying " ought," and therefore implies 

 the operation of some agent prior to the agent spoken of, or in other words is 

 pattive. This will appear more evident, if we clioose another pronoun. If I say 

 that " lie will study Geology," I predict his occupation, and only trace its causation 

 as far back as his own mind. " He shall study," &c. at once declares that the be- 

 ginning of that scries of events which ends in his geological occupation, is something 

 external or prior to bis own feelings on the matter. 



