16 UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN 



of our present knowledge) of the action of a monkey in a 

 cage to the laws of mechanics. The clockmaker, knowing 

 something of the laws in question and knowing also the size, 

 shape, arrangement and composition of the pieces of metal 

 composing the clock, can deduce with a high degree of preci- 

 sion how a given clock will behave, — where its minute-hand, 

 for example, will be at a specified moment of solar time, even 

 though of this clock's action, or even of any clock, as such, 

 he had no previous experience. One who knew all now 

 known laws of mechanics and chemistry, and knew also, all 

 that the best anatomist could at present tell about the number, 

 arrangement and chemical composition of the pieces of matter 

 composing the monkey, — but knew only these things — would 

 still be wholly unable to deduce the position of the monkey 

 in the cage at any given moment. And it is by this test, and 

 this test alone, that we can determine whether a specified 

 phenomenon does or does not fall within a given unified body 

 of knowledge. Clock-phenomena come within the science of 

 physics, because you can deduce particular cases of clock- 

 action from several physical laws which apply not only to 

 clocks but also to motor-cars and mechanical tops and solar 

 systems. Monkey-phenomena have not yet been brought 

 within the science of physics, because you cannot as yet 

 deduce them from laws which apply equally to monkeys and 

 to machines and to solar systems — that is, to both organic 

 and inorganic things. 



Observe that from a knowledge of the general law alone 

 you can never deduce anything; when we say that particular 

 clock-phenomena are deducible from the laws of physics we 

 do not mean that one who knew those laws as generalizations 

 but had no information at all about a particular clock could 

 tell us how that clock would behave. For deducing a par- 

 ticular case from a general law you must always have, in ad- 

 dition to your knowledge of the law, some empirical knowl- 

 edge of the particular case ; you must know, for example, of 

 how many pieces, of what kind and size, the clock-works are 



