president's address —SECTIOX J. 197 



In the history of British thought, psychology — or the science 

 of the facts of mind — has been intermingled with metaphysics, or 

 philosophy in the stricter acceptation of the words, as denoting the 

 theory of first principles. The name of Locke, for example, will 

 be long remembered as that of one who gave a powerfvd impetus 

 to the study of mental science ; but Avhile he adopted the psycho- 

 logical method of observing the facts of mind, in so far as he could 

 read these in himself or decipher them from the language and acts 

 of others, his chief aim was philosophical. His purpose, as he 

 said, was to inquire into the origin, certainty, and extent of human 

 knowledge. In the spirit of natural science he sought to observe, 

 analyse, and classify the mental facts before him, and to ascertain 

 their sequences and co-existences ; but, in doing so, he S(mght also 

 to solve questions as to the first principles of knowledge and of 

 reality as known to us, and the questions which he raised were 

 answered by his successors in ways which would have astonished 

 him. Coming down to the Scottish school, whose tenets were in 

 vogue in the first half of the present century, we find that it also 

 represented philosophy as an inquiry into the human mind, re- 

 quiring careful observation of mental facts ; but, above all, it aimed 

 at the establishment of first principles, principles of common sense 

 or primary beliefs, which might be accepted as idtimate criteria of 

 truth. FiA-en by J. S. Mill and Bain Ave find inquiries into mental 

 facts, and questions of the origin, the validity, and the limits of 

 human knowledge, mingled together as parts of one science; and, 

 in fact, the vague name mental philosophy which is in use to-day, 

 and Avhich has so often been defined as the science of mind, 

 testifies to the common practice of binding questions of mental 

 fact which belong to psychology with philosophical questions 

 which relate to the first principles of knowledge and of being. 



Now, there can be no doubt that the endless conflicts of philo- 

 sophic thought have generated a profound distrust of the methods 

 and conclusions of philosophy. Many fail to see that from the 

 discussion of centuries any solid ground of vantage has been 

 gained, and Avhen they .try to enter into these controversies for 

 themseh'es they feel — 



As on a darkling plain 



Swept with confused alarms of struggle and fight, 



Where ignorant armies clash by night ! 



Men of science in particular ask for the positive results to be 

 obtained by generalisation from authenticated facts, or by demon- 

 strative reasoning ; and, dominated by this craving, they are apt 

 to set aside the questions of philosophy, not only as lying beyond 

 their special quest, but also as in themselves unprofitable or in- 

 soluble. I may be tempted to ask, in the sequel, if this is reason- 

 able. The fact, at least, is notorious. And so closely have the 

 fortunes of jisychology been boimd up with those of philosoj)hy, 

 that both have fallen under the same suspicion. Thus, I think, 



