president's address SECTION J. 203 



meant that lie is to attend only to sensations and ideas, or other 

 states of consciousness, without ascribing them to a mind whose 

 states they are, then we may reply, with Lotze, that this " involves- 

 a wilful departure from what is actually given in experience," since 

 a mere sensation or idea " without a subject is nowhere to be met 

 with as a fact." And if we speak of phenomena, do we not imply 

 some reality of which we know the phenomena or appearances ? 

 Here, then, we find ourselves encompassed by metaphysical ques- 

 tions. While psychology has been sometimes used to assist the 

 doctrine of a transcendent ego, it has been used equally in the in- 

 terests of an atomistic philosophy — as when Hume descended into 

 his own consciousness, with the result that he never caught himself 

 without a perception, and never succeeded in finding anything 

 more. If in mental science we are to maintain the strictly 

 scientific point of view, the only cure for such controversies is 

 to state at the outset the assumptions which we make. It seems 

 to me that it would be enough for psychology to begin with that 

 common-sense assumption of the self, or I, which is conveyed in 

 ordinary language, leaving it to metaphysics to decide what is the 

 precise meaning to be given to this conception. There cannot be 

 a doubt that there is some bond of connection between our suc- 

 cessive states of consciousness. Even in the strange cases of 

 double personality the facts of each phase are in some way bound 

 together. Take, for example, the oft-quoted case of Felida X.» 

 who alternated between her natural condition, in which she was 

 serious and reserved, and a condition of restless gaiety. The events 

 of each condition were knit together as belonging to the experience 

 of the same person ; and there was a connection also between the 

 two, since during the second condition the occurrences of the first 

 were remembered. But after pyschology has said its last word 

 about memory, or customary feelings, or anything else, as eluci- 

 dating the connection of oiu- states of consciousness, the meaning 

 of personality remains for the treatment of philosophy. On the 

 other hand, the psychologist is at liberty, if he thinks it will do him 

 any good, to begin with the hypothesis that states of consciousness 

 are separate existences. But even if such a hypothesis could 

 endure the test of comparison with the mental facts, it, too, would 

 need to be referred to the criticism of philosophy. Another instance 

 of the temptation to pass lightly from psychology to metaphysics 

 may be found in the attitude of the psychologist towards the 

 material world. He begins by adopting the dualism of ordinary 

 thought, w^hich supposes the objects which we perceive in space to 

 be altogether different from the percipient mind. But his treat- 

 ment as a psychologist limits him to impressions and ideas, 

 sensations and percepts ; he nowhere comes into contact with the 

 independent material world which he postulated. What, then, can 

 be more natural than that his thought should turn back on itself, 

 and that he should ask if the material world may not be resolved 



