490 PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION G. 



To do this it will be necessary to make a careful examination 

 of the bases of the ' ' transferable vote ' ' and the ' ' party list ' ' 

 systems : to note the defects in each, carefully distinguishing those 

 of a trifling nature which can be remedied from those of a more 

 serious and fundamental nature which are incurable. It will be 

 even more necessary to be able to appraise the best points of each 

 system, with the object of combining them as far as possible into 

 another system which shall be superior to either. And it will be 

 necessary to preface these investigations with an inquiry into the 

 operations of the existing system so that we may be guided by its 

 imperfections to a knowledge of what to avoid, and enabled to lay 

 down the principles which will be tjie foundation of a better system 

 to replace it. 



The present paper is the outcome of an attempt to carry out an 

 inquiry on these lines. It is based on the belief — the reasons for 

 which will be given in due course — that it is undesirable now for 

 either of the competing systems of proportional representation to 

 be carried out in its integrity. The best solution of the difficulty 

 i? a compromise, and the practical scheme put forward at the end 

 of the paper represents such a compromise; one, moreover, that 

 will, I trust, prove free from serious theoretical objection, and that 

 will lend itself easily to being operated in practice. 



Inequalities of the Pbesent Electoral System. 



The system under which the present House of Representatives 

 is elected is the single-member system, imported from England, 

 and it is that country which furnishes the most striking examples 

 of its inefficiency. A party in a constituency may come within one 

 vote of victory, but if it fails the thousands of votes which it has 

 polled do not go to augment its strength elsewhere, but are ut- 

 terly lost. With the exception of a few towns returning two mem- 

 bers, and the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and Dublin, the 

 whole country is divided into single-member constituencies, and the 

 strength of a party in the House of Commons is measured, not in 

 proportion to its voting strength in the country, but according to 

 the number of these single-member electorates in which for the 

 time being it finds itself in a majority. Add to this the fact that 

 the electorates are most unequal in size, and we are prepared at 

 once for consequences of the gravest nature. The most serious 

 anomalies which occur under the system can be summarized as 

 follows : — 



(«) Majorities are practically never proportional to the voting 

 strength, and are usually grossly exaggerated. 



(b) Minorities are usually underrepresented, and sometime* 

 get no representation at all. 



