492 PKOCEEDINGS OF SECTION G. 



1,000 votes must be taken from A and transferred to other can- 

 didates. But the question arises, "How is this to be effected?" 

 If we take 1,000 votes at random we might find all the second 

 preferences given to B. Another 1,000 taken at random might all 

 be given to C. And the chances of election of B and G might 

 depend entirely on how the 1,000 second preferences were taken 

 from A's votes. What is to be done to hold the scales evenly 

 between the remaining candidates? 



Three proposals have been made, which will be known to you 

 as Lubbock's, Clark's, and Gregory's methods. They are too 

 well-known to require discussion. 



Such, with its modifications, is the Hare system. We will 

 consider some of the objections. 



It became evident at a very early stage that, in order to carry 

 out the elaborate operations of transfer, it would be necessary to 

 bring all the votes together to one central polling station. In a 

 small town this would not matter, but if a whole State was the 

 electoral unit this would be a serious practical drawback. In 

 Western Australia, for example, the votes could not be collected at 

 Perth under one month. It would not be advisable to condemn a 

 system on account of practical defects (which might be remedied) 

 i^ its theoretical basis was perfectly sound. Unfortunately, how- 

 ever, the Hare system is open to criticisin of a much more 

 damaging nature. 



The system would be a valuable one if it was perfectly impartial 

 ill its arbitrament between political parties, candidates, and elec- 

 tors. If a voter distributes his preferences among candidates of 

 Ids own party, then the Hare system gives substantially propor- 

 tional representation to the parties. From this point of view, jus- 

 tice is done. But as between different candidates and different 

 classes of voters the scheme works unfairly, as may be demonstrated 

 by the following reasoning : — 



An essential feature of the system is that the first candidate 

 tc be eliminated is the one with fewest first preferences. Suppose 

 a party consisted of an amalgamation of ten sections, each of which 

 iiad a champion, who polled all its first preferences. All the second 

 preferences of the whole party might be given to the party leader, 

 or some universal favourite. This would constitute an over- 

 whelming desire of the electors of the party to see him returned. 

 Yet under the Hare system he would be the first candidate eli- 

 minated because he had no first preferences. 



The result is that the system operates in favour of sectional 

 candidates within a party, and against those candidates who repre- 

 sent the party as a whole. 



