PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION Q. 497 



Suppose a constituency returns n + 1 members, and each elector 

 has only n votes. Suppose the larger party puts forward n + 1 

 candidates, and the smaller party puts forward n. Then if the 

 majority party polls just more than "^"*" ^ 100 per cent., il can 

 be established that it will win all the seats. On the other hand, 

 if it polls just less than this amount it only wins one seat. A 

 system which plays such practical jokes is evidently one which can 

 teach us nothing in electoral matters, except what to avoid. 



» Cumulative Vote. 



This system, like the Limited Vote, has been introduced into 

 constituencies returning a large number of members, with the 

 object of giving some representation to minorities which otherwise 

 would not get it. It differs in this respect that, whereas under the 

 Limited Vote and the Block Vote the elector could only give one 

 vote to each candidate, he can, under the cumulative vote, give as 

 many votes to each as he pleases, subject only to the restriction 

 that his total number of votes must not exceed the number of can- 

 didates to be elected. It has been used in England in connexion 

 with School Board elections, and the principle on which it is based 

 is simple. If there are V votes polled and n candidates to be 

 elected, then the Droop quota is ^^-^ + 1 and any candidate who can 

 poll this total will be elected. It is thus apparently suited to such 

 elections as those for a School Board, where men holding certain 

 ideas in common — for example, members of the same religious body 

 — could cumulate all their votes upon one or two candidates, and 

 thus secure representation, whilst their numbers would probably 

 not enable them to influence a parliamentary election. Inasmuch, 

 then, as it leads to minority representation of a sort, cumulative 

 voting is superior to the " majority " system. But the fatal objec- 

 tion to it is the haphazard nature of its operations. 



Preferential Voting. 

 Suppose there are, say, seven candidates. A, B, C . . . . for a 

 number of seats, and an elector, wishing to record his preferences, 

 placed them in that order. Under the Hare system he would only 

 have one vote, but he is allowed to place the figure 1 opposite A , 

 the figure 2 opposite B, the figure 3 opposite G, and so on. This 

 means that the vote is to be given to A, but in the event of the 

 election or rejection of A, the vote is to be given to B, after him 

 G, and so on. 



Under Laplace's system, on the contrary, the elector places the 

 figure 7 opposite .4 , the figure 6 opposite B, the figure 5 opposite 

 -C, and so on, working down the numerical scale instead of up. He 

 virtually gives seven votes of diflerent weights, instead of one 



