PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION G. 



i99 



vote " systems will be necessary to achieve this. These systems 

 must, however, be modified so ^s to eliminate the inherent defects 

 which have already been disclosed. Finally, it is desirable that the 

 system should be based as far as possible upon the existing electoral 

 machinery. 



The previous portion of the paper gives a clear idea of the 

 fundamental conditions which a thoroughly acceptable electoral 

 scheme must satisfy. I will summarize them as follows: — 



(«) In order to escape the worst features of the present 

 " majority system," there must be large electorates 

 returning several members : 

 (6) The majority of voters in an electorate should be repre- 

 sented by a majority of members : 



(c) A minority of voters should, as far as possible, have as 



many members as its voting strength entitles it to : 



(d) Some provision m.ust be made for transfer of votes, so 



that as far as possible voters may not be dis- 

 franchised ; 



(e) The scheme should be easily intelligible to the elector 



and economical of the time of the returning officer; 

 (/) It sliould be adapted as nearly as possible to the present 

 electoral organization. 



Most ot these desiderata will be, I believe, accepted by every- 

 body without demur. 



There are theoretical reasons tor preferring odd-iiieniber con- 

 stituencies to even-member constituencies. Bat in formulating 

 a plan to be adaptable to Australian conditions the theoretical 

 argument is backed up by a practical argument of great power, 

 embodied in condition (/). The constitution, in providing for tiie 

 representation of the States in the House of Representatives 

 enacted that none of the original States should have less than five 

 members. Five members each were assigned to Tasmania and 

 Western Australia; seven to South Australia; and at the present 

 time Queensland has ten members allotted to it; Victoria, twenty- 

 one; and New South Wales twenty-seven. This immediately points 

 to the advi.gability of having five-member and seven-member con- 

 stituencies. Tasmania and Western Australia would each form a 

 five-member constituency. South Australia would constitute a 

 seven-member constituency. The ten existing constituencies of 

 Queensland could be combined into two five-member constituencies. 

 The twenty-one constituencies of Victoria would form three seven- 

 member groups; and lastly, the twenty-seven , members from New 

 South Wales could be arranged irj^o four constituencies of five 

 members each and one of seven members. 



