898 PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION G. 
“The operation of this rule may be excluded by the €Xpress or 
implied provisions of the law relating to the subject.” 
As to this, there is probably no room for doubt. 
The next rule (which, it is believed, is not to be found in any 
of the books) deals with extraordinary emergencies :— 
“ BXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCIES. 
‘27. Subject to the express provisions of this code relating to 
acts done upon compulsion or provocation. or in self-defence, a 
person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission done or 
made under such circumstances of sudden or extraordinary 
emergency that an ordinary person possessing ordinary power of 
self-control could not reasonably be expected to act otherwise.” 
On this section it may be remarked that it gives effect to the 
principle that no man is expected (for the purposes of Criminal 
Law, at all events) to be wiser or better than all mankind. It is 
conceived that this is a rule of the Common Law, as it undoubtedly 
is a rule upon which any jury would desire to act. It may, 
perhaps, be said that it sums up nearly all the Common Law rules 
as to excuses for an act which is primd facie criminal. 
The exceptions as to compulsion, provocation, and self-defence 
are necessary, because there are positive and definite rules dealing 
with these cases, which may be regarded as requiring exceptional 
treatment. 
Then follow the rules as to insanity and intoxication :— 
“PRESUMPTION OF SANITY. 
“© 28, Every person is presumed to be of sound mind, and to 
have been of sound mind at any time which comes in question, 
until the contrary is proved. 
* INSANITY. 
“99, A person is not criminally responsible for an act or 
omission if at the time of doing the act or making the omission 
he is in such a state of mental disease or natural mental infirmity 
as to deprive him of capacity to understand what he is doing, or 
of capacity to control his actions, or of capacity to know that he 
ought not to do the act or make the omission. 
ca person whose mind, at the time of his doing or omitting to 
do an act, is affected by the delusions on some specific matter or 
matters, but who is not otherwise entitled to the benefit of the 
foregoing provisions of this section, is criminally responsible for 
the act or omission to the same extent as if the real state of 
things had been such as he was induced by the delusions to 
believe to exist. 
