900 PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION G. 
The subject has been much considered by the Continental 
nations of Europe. Before referring to the particular provisions 
of their codes it may be desirable to offer a few observations on 
the general principles applicable to the matter. An act to involve 
criminal responsibility must be voluntary, as distinguished from 
involuntary (s. 25)—that is to say, it must be accompanied by 
volition. In order that an action may be accompanied by volition 
there must be in the first place perception, more or less accurate, 
of the facts, then a determination or choice of the action to be 
taken upon those facts, and finally the action. If the person in 
question is incapable, from mental disorder, of rightly perceiving 
the facts, he should be treated on the same footing as a man who 
in good faith misapprehends the facts (s. 26). If he is for the 
same cause incapable of exercising the power of determination or 
choice, he should be treated on the same footing as a man who 
does an act independently of the exercise of his will (s. 25). So 
far there is little reason for controversy. But it is conceived that 
our law assumes the notion of duty. No one supposes that every- 
one or anyone knows all the provisions of the criminal law. Yet 
no one above the age of discretion (s. 31) is excused by ignorance 
of law (s. 24). Why is the distinction drawn at a particular 
age? Not, surely, because at that age knowledge of the law 
comes to a child, but because he is then supposed “to be capable 
of knowing that some things ought not to be done—z.e., of appre- 
hending the idea of duty. If this is so, there is a third element 
of criminal responsibility corresponding to the capacity of a child 
who has reached the age of discretion ; and a person who, by 
reason of mental disorder, is in the condition of a child as to 
capacity of apprehending the notion of duty, ought to be equally 
free from criminal responsibility. This last element seems to be 
wanting in the definition of insanity given in the Continental 
codes, but it is, probably, part of the Jaw of England. 
The following statements of the definition of insanity given 
in the various Continental codes and draft codes are taken from the 
Ministerial explanation made by Signor Zanardelli in introducing 
the Italian Penal Code to the Legislature in 1888. (The defini- 
tion in the Draft Code as introduced was as follows :—“ A person 
is not punishable who, at the moment when he committed the act, 
was in such a state of defect or morbid affection (alterazione) of 
the mind as to deprive him of consciousness of his acts or of the 
possibility of acting otherwise.’’) 
Dutch Code: ‘Incomplete development or morbid disturbance 
of the intelligence.’ 
xerman Code: ‘Deprivation of understanding or condition of 
morbid affection of the mental faculties.’ 
Hungarian Code: ‘State of unconsciousness or disturbance 
of the intellectual faculties.’ 
