CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. 901 
Code of Zurich: ‘If the faculties of the mind of the accused 
were overturned in such a manner as not to possess the attitude 
of free determination or the discernment necessary to understand 
the criminal nature of the act.’ 
Austrian Draft of 1881: ‘State of want of understanding or of 
deficient development or disturbance of the intellectual faculties.’ 
Russian Draft of 1881: ‘Insufficiency of the intellectual 
faculties, or morbid disturbance of the activity of the mind 
(spirito), or state of unconsciousness.’ 
The definition actually adopted in the Italian Code may be 
thus translated: ‘Such a state of infirmity of mind (mente) as to 
deprive him of consciousness of his act or of freedom of action.’ 
(s. 46). 
The definition given in section 29, above, is substantially the 
same as this, with the addition of the element of moral capacity. 
The New York Code, as amended in 1882, adopts the words 
of the Judges in McNaghten’ S case. 
The Code Napoleon, which was enacted before the subject 
had been so fully considered as it has been of late years, puts 
insanity and compulsion together. ‘It is neither crime nor mis- 
demeanour (délit) when the accused person was in a state of 
insanity (démence) at the time of the act, or if he was constrained 
by a force which he could not resist.’ (Code Pénal, Art. 64.) 
Any direction to a jury which omitted a reference to any one 
of the three elements—capacity of perception, capacity of choice, 
and moral capacity—in a case in which such an element was 
material would, probably, be contrary to Common Law. As to 
the reasonableness of the rule, as stated in section 29, there is little 
room for doubt. A moment’s consideration will suggest cases in 
which any two of the three elements may be present, while the 
third is absent, and in which it would be absurd to hold the actor 
criminally responsible. It is important to remember, however, 
that the absence of either capacity is immaterial, unless it arises 
from mental disorder or infirmity. 
It will be observed that the rule stated in section 29, con- 
sidered from the points of view to which attention has been 
invited, is merely a particular instance of the application of the 
general rules determining the question of criminal responsibility 
stated in ss. 25, 26, and 31. 
The second paragraph of the section embodies the opinion of 
the Judges on the question actually submitted to them in 
McNaghten’s case. 
Othe provisions of the chapter are as follows :— 
‘IMMATURE AGE 
“31. A person under the age of 7 years is not criminally 
responsible for any act or omission. 
