1094 PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION J. 
it arises is not final, secondly that it is a division; for not 
merely does it make a crude distinction between phenomena 
merely according to the category of spacc, but it sets asunder 
what it found united. How shall they be again united, unless 
we first abandon our arbitrary division? For a knowing subject, 
the final view of things must be based on knowledge. However 
true it may be that, taking space as basis of our analysis, knower 
is here and known is there, distinct and divisible ; from the stand- 
point of knowledge, knower and known are united, distinct but 
indivisible, mutually necessary and inseparable. Everything 
objective has its subjective aspect ; every thing is also a feeling ; 
otherwise, for knowledge, it would not exist. And it is for 
knowledge, for consciousness, that we analyse. 
The phase of consciousness which yields us subject and object 
as inseparable aspects of the one phenomenon is technically known 
as Reflection. Cogitatur—it is knawn, it thinks—we have no 
impersonal verb of the kind—is its expression ; and observe, 
nothing more is necessary, For cogito, I think, merely expresses 
the unity and continuity in time of the subjective aspect, which, 
along with its objective aspect, becomes object in Reflection, and, 
at the same time, its separation from the object. This mode of 
consciousness—direct, as it is called—must justify itself by reflec- 
tive. In reflectionthere isnoself-consciousness; but reflectionis the 
hasis of self-consciousness. Preceding reflection there is a mode 
of consciousness—primary, as we e observe it in the child-—-wherein 
the subjective aspect has not yet become object ; but reflection 
has not to justify itself by this mode, seeing that it alone makes 
explicit what was implicit in the latter---makes real its poten- 
tiality ; whereas the division and separation performed by direct 
consciousness presupposes and assumes the distinction performed 
by reflection. 
Reflection is the decisive mode of all consciousness. 
§ The world in primary consciousness is one, and everything 
given therein is real. Reflection shows the ground of this reality, 
in that the real is given, but given in consciousness. 
There is, however nother kind of question as to reality, which 
arises in direct consciousness—another form of the old metaphy- 
sical scruple, Cartesian doubt. It begins and ends in direct 
consciousness: its last word is cogito, Las object to myself cannot 
be other than real ; but these other things. . .? 
But these other things ave given in consciousness! Even a 
sense-hallucination is a reality, as such ; reflection cannot shake 
it. Its rejection is the result of a judgment, delivered according 
to the evidence of full consciousness directed by attention ; its 
persistence or non-persistence for full consciousness determines its 
secondary reality or unreality. 
