1096 PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION J. 
Otherwise, why this division of the world into Matter and Mind ? 
Was there not many another possible line of sectivn ? 
Or otherwise : since all things are in the primary sense real, and 
since consciousness is the test of this reality, why, in establishing 
this secondary distinction of real and unreal, of which conscious- 
ness is the sole arbiter, ignore a certain part of consciousness, 
because of its apparent disconnection with the material objects 
which occupy space? Are we not, in making this conception our 
basis of reality, granting everything to a set of interests, pressing, 
in regard to this body which belongs to us? Logical reason for 
such standpoint there is none: interest is the key of the 
situation. 
Standpoints—from many such do we deal with the world after 
our separation of its subjective and objective aspects. Each point 
of view is arbitrary: it is the strategic position of a certain 
interest—is not Occam’s famous razor merely the expression of a 
mental need for clearness !—directing the attention towards its 
object. Attention directed by interest—that is, the force which 
sets in motion the whole machinery of human thought and 
endeavour. 
As has been said, we break up the fact. We abstract the 
subjective aspect; the objective remains poorer. We further break 
up our abstracta, according to each mene, interest. Do we not 
thereby limit the range of our possible conclusions? Whereupon 
Task: Is this not merely the necessary zpodpopos to some further 
reunion, determined by the unity of interests? Is it not the search 
after another, fuller Fact? That we must so preceed with the 
world as we do, shows—that it does not recognise our interests : 
the objective world is fixed and firm; they not. Are we not aiming 
at a transformation of it, wherein their importance shall be as 
absolute a fact as the existence of this sheet of paper ? 
The question brings to light a certain human doubt,— Am J... ? 
We shall recur to it later on. 
§ The procedure of the abstract intellect, by its very simplicity, 
is a good example of the way in which man remoulds reality in 
answer to his interests. 
The starting-point of the intellect is the concept. The form of 
the intellect is the same as that of perception: the concept is 
formed out of reality, but rejects all phases of the latter which 
are not required for the satisfaction of the interest in question. 
Thus, for several phases of reality, meeting in various ways in 
different objects, we have a set of concepts, formed by the atten- 
tion singling out each phase from all the objects in which it occurs. 
The unity of the object, already detached from the unity of Fact, 
is broken up according to the variety cf interests, whose unity is 
