528 fROCEEDINGS OF SECTION Gl. 



Both these widely diverging schools of thought hold one concep- 

 tion in common. They agree that the State exists for a particular 

 purpose, and that this purpose is to enable the persons composing 

 the community to lead happier lives than otherwise would be possible. 

 This common conception may therefore be fitly taken as the starting 

 point of this inquiry. 



The object of State action being the happiness of the individuals 

 forming the community, the first question to be examined is, can the 

 State possibly achieve this object by actions determined upon empiri- 

 cally — i.e., by weighing '' the balance of advantages " resulting from 

 such actions? This very conception admits that State action may be 

 disadvantageous as well as advantageous — i.e., that its results do not 

 depend upon chance, nor upon the intentions of the State, but are 

 determined by the universal and unalterable causal relation between 

 acts and their results. It is, however, equally clear that if such 

 causal relations exist, the result of every State action may be deduced 

 from these unalterable causal relations. 



It may, however, be contended that it is easier to pursue the 

 balance of advantages resulting from any action of the State — i.e., 

 its immediate as well as its remote sequences, than to recognise the 

 law of causal relation which determines the sequences of such acts. 

 The slightest examination, however, establishes the fact that the 

 former course, far from being more easy, is actually impossible. It is 

 admittedly difficult for a single individual to estimate the conduct 

 which will ensm'e the greatest happiness to himself and his immediate 

 family. Hence individuals, more and more, allow their conduct to be 

 guided by jorinciples, in the sure expectation that conduct so guided 

 is more conducive to their happiness and that of their dependents 

 than conduct based on considerations of expediency. This difficulty 

 of the indi-sadual is, however, infinitesimal compared with that of the 

 State. For the State deals with millions of individuals, all differing 

 in innumerable ways from each other and from the persons compos- 

 ing the goveramental agencies which enact and administer the laws 

 that are to ensure their happiness. Nevertheless, the persons enact- 

 ing and administering the laws have no other guidance than their 

 own feelings to determine the kinds, degrees, and sequences of the 

 countless acts, the totality of which constitutes the happiness of the 

 innumerable persons, all differently constituted, from them and from 

 eacli other, the happiness of whom and of their descendants they 

 endeavour to ensure. The object, individual happiness, and the 

 agencies by which it can be attained are thus simple when compared 

 with the infinite complexity of the object, general happiness, and 

 the agencies by which it can be attained. Yet, if individual conduct 

 aiming at tlie former cannot be usefully guided by merely empirical 

 considerations, it must be obvious that such considerations cannot 

 possibly furnish a reliable guide to conduct aiming at general 

 happiness. 



The State, guided by purely empirical considerations, can thus 

 obtain no certainty that any one of its acts will add to the happiness 

 of the individuals composing the community. The contrary concep- 

 tion, moreover, recognising no limit to the interference of the State, 

 tends, in favourable circumstances, to the transference of innumerable 



