THE PROXY VOTE. 567 



Assuming this classification in a six-iuember district, two im- 

 portant consequences follow. First, it' an election was held in this 

 district, one candidate of each type would be elected. The successful 

 candidates of the second type would be Q, A, D, with 247, 189, 203 

 votes respectively. Those of the first type would have respectively 

 334, 451, 376 votes, but who the successful candidates are would 

 depend on the way in which the secondary and subsequent votes were 

 cast. 



Next, from this clasisification we can deduce the mind of the whole 

 distinct for and against each of the three policies. From it we at 

 once s:et the following statement : — 



726 1,074 901 899 812 988 



Thus we see that the policy of the Opposition is carried, and that 

 the policies of the Government and Third party are defeated, the 

 decision in each of the three cases being by an absolute majority of 

 the whole of the electors in the six-member district considered. 



But, as the figxires in the preceding statement represent, in nuUi- 

 grams, the weights of the ingots which would be cast into the scales on 

 the three divisions contemplated, it follows that by the proxy vote a 

 parliament can be elected which is bound to give effect to the v.i!i of 

 the electors as regards each of the three party policies. 



For simplicity , the case of one six-member district alone has been 

 considered. But the results already stated would apply to the aggre- 

 gate of the results in several six-member districts. 



To apply the scheme to the election of Bepreseiitatives, it would 

 be sufficient to divide each State into six-member districts. The 

 number of such districts is not a matter of great importance. For the 

 weight of each State in the House would depend not on the number 

 of its members but on the weight of its ingots. Thus one great 

 incidental advantage of the scheme would be continuous automatic 

 adjustment of the weight of each State without any need whatsoever 

 for frequent periodical readjustments of electoral boundaries. 



But in the election of Senators a slight modification would be 

 necessary. Inasmuch as the Federal Constitution requires each State 

 to have the same amount of representation in the Senate, it would be 

 sufficient to make the total weight of ingots for each State the same. 



To maJce the scheme theoretically perfect it would be necessary 

 tj apply the contingent vote unfhiji each tj-pe only. Unless this be 

 done, one of the types might get no representatives. For instance, if 

 in the latter stages of the election just discussed two Opposition 

 candidates had 25], 200 votes respectively, the '' TG" candidate would 

 Le at the bottom of tiie poll, and would therefore be rejected unless 

 the restrictions suggested were made. But the introduction of this 

 restriction might well be postponed till actual experience showed that 

 it was really necessary. 



