484 PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION GI. 



an inefficient and precarious alliance ; or shall they, while retaining full 

 internal independence, be fused into one nation as regards all dealings with 

 other Powers ? Looked at in this light, the Federal system is emphatically 

 a system of union, and of that strength which follows upon union. The 

 Federal connection is in its place wherever the several members to be united 

 are fitted for that species of union and for no other. It requires a sufficient 

 degree of community in origin or feeling or interest to allow the several 

 members to work together up to a certain point. It requires that there 

 should not be that perfect degree of community, or rather industry, which 

 allows the several members to be fused together for all purposes.' Where 

 there is no community at all, Federalism is inappropriate ; xhc Cities or States 

 had better remain wholly independent and take their chance of the advan- 

 tages and disadvantages of the system of small Commonwealths. Where 

 community rises into identity. Federalism is equallv inappropriate ; the 

 Cities or States had better sink into mere counties of a kingdom or con- 

 solidated republic, and take their chance of the advantages and disad- 

 vantages of the system of large States. But in the intermediate set of 

 circumstances — the circumstances Peloponnisos struggling against Mace- 

 donia, of Switzerland struggling against Austria, of the Netherlands 

 struggling against Spain, of the American colonies struggling against 

 England — Federalism is the true solvent. It gives as much of union as fhe 

 members need, and not more than they need. 



***** 

 Wherever either closer union or more entire separation is desirable, 

 Federalism is out of place. It is out of place if it attempts either to break 

 asunder what is more closely united or to unite what is wholly incapable 

 of union. Its mission is to unite to a certain extent what is capable of a 

 certain amount of union, and no more. It is an intermediate point between 

 two extremes, capable either of being despised as a compromise or of being 

 extolled as the golden mean.' 



This being the case, it would obviously be absurd to criticise 

 the federal system as if it were a mere alternative to the unitary 

 system of government, and to complain of limitations which are of 

 its essence, and defects which are inherent in it. 



No student of history or politics would deny its extreme 

 ingenuity as a device to meet the particular conditions to which it is 

 adapted, or its great usefulness at certain points in the world's 

 histor3^ The recognition of these, however, need not blind us to 

 the fact that the federal system, in its more highly developed forms 

 — in other words, in the form in which we know it in the United 

 States and Australia — has certain weaknesses and dangers, which 

 will always tend to prevent it from being a satisfactory form of 

 government. It is these weaknesses and dangers which will form 

 the subject of the observations which follow. These may possibly 

 have some practical interest, for it must not be forgotten that, 

 though the germ of the federal idea is as old as the fourth century 

 B.C., the first instance of a developed form of federal government, 

 in any shape comparable to that which exists in Australia to-day 

 was the Constitution of the United States. All earlier unions, of 

 which there were several, came into existence primarily for the 

 purposes of mutual defence, and the powers of the general govern- 

 ment were mainly limited to those incidental to this purpose. It is 

 not until we come to the Constitution of the United States, in 1788, 

 that we find a federation that takes for its province, not merely 

 matters of defence, and external relations, but a large number of 



