FEDERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. 487 



The method by which this is done is, for the purposes of these 

 observations, immaterial. 



Passing now to a criticism of the federal sj'stem, as explained 

 above, it will be evident, from what has been said, that it involves 

 a somewhat precise definition and classification of the various 

 subject matters with which governments are called upon to deal ; 

 and further, that it depends largely for its efficiency upon the 

 precision with which this definition and classification are effected. 

 A unitary government, it need hardly be said, involves no such 

 necessity. There every governmental power, assuming the govern- 

 ment to be sovereign, belongs to a single authority. Certain subject 

 matters may for purposes of convenience be delegated to sub- 

 ordinate bodies, but all such delegations may be revoked at will. 

 Under the federal system, however, the necessity for definition and 

 classification is fundamental. 



This necessity obtrudes itself at two points. First in the fram- 

 ing of the Constitution. The crucial question, at this stage, is the 

 question which subjects shall be assigned to the central government, 

 and which reserved to the local authorities. This must be answ^ered 

 on some definite principle. You cannot have a merely arbitrary 

 distribution. Powers, which in their nature are national, must be 

 vested in the national authority ; those which in their nature are 

 local must be left to the local authorities. So that on the threshold 

 of federation one is faced with the necessity of classifying the subject 

 matters of governmental control, according to their national or 

 local character. 



It is not difficult to give illustrations showing that it is 

 a matter of considerable difficulty to make such a classification 

 with any approach to precision. There are some subjects, it is 

 true, which clearly fall within the category of national matters. 

 Defence and the maintenance of relations with external countries 

 and peoples,for example, are matters which clearly belong to the 

 province of the general government. And so long as a federation 

 is limited to matters of this kind, as were the earlier federations, 

 the difficulty now adverted to is not apparent. But when the 

 purposes of the union are desired to extend far beyond these ob- 

 viously national matters, and to cover a considerable area of the 

 internal concerns of the federating States, it cannot be escaped. 

 Matters such as trade and commerce, immigration, education, regu- 

 lation of industrial conditions, do not fall readily and obviously into 

 one category or the other. For some purposes, and from some 

 points of view, such matters may be appropriately subjected to 

 national control. For other purposes, and from other points of 

 view, local regulation may be more efficient and desirable. The 

 federal system, however, makes it necessary to assign the ultimate 

 control over these subjects to one authority or the other — in other 

 words, to classify them as either national or local. If it be said that 

 this difficulty can be avoided by dividing up these subjects, and 

 assigning the control over one part to the central, and over other 

 parts to local authorities, the answer is that this merely accentuates 



