488 PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION GI. 



the necessity for precise delinition and classification, and involves 

 difficulties of another kind, which will be shortly referred to. Nor 

 does the device of giving concurrent control to both central and 

 local governments afford any permanent and complete solution of 

 the problem, for the ultimate power over every subject must be 

 reposed in one authority or the other. 



But apart from this inherent difficulty in the way of a satis- 

 factory classification of the subjects of governmental control, as 

 national or local (which arises out of the nature of the subject 

 matter), there are other obstacles which are none the less serious 

 because they are of a factitious and unessential kind. At whatever 

 period of history a federal constitution is formed, the distribution 

 of powers between central and local governments must of necessity 

 be influenced to a very large extent by the special temporary con- 

 ditions, social, industrial, political, religious, of the epoch in which 

 it takes shape. This is particularly true where the acceptance of 

 the Constitutional instrument depends, as it did in Austraha, and 

 in the United States, on a popular vote. The question of the dis- 

 tribution of powers is the one, of all others, which excites popular 

 interest, and arouses popular passion, in the federating States. Con- 

 sequently, the ultimate form of the distribution almost invariably 

 represents a compromise between the idealism of those who want 

 to make it logically sound, and the political wisdom of those who are 

 determined that their work shall receive popular endorsement. The 

 result of this is that subjects which really belong to the category 

 of national matters are for temporary or local reasons reserved, in 

 whole or in part, to the States : or less commonly, that the converse 

 mistake is made. In either case, a distribution of powers, which 

 must be relatively stable and permanent, and should be based 

 solely upon a distinction in the nature of the powers themselves, 

 is influenced to a very large extent by circumstances of a local and 

 temporary character. 



This is the first point at which the necessity for the definition 

 and classification of governmental powers presents itself, and tends 

 to render the planning of a Federal Constitution a somewhat difficult 

 form of constitutional architecture. It appears again, with its 

 attendant difficulties, when, the constitution having been brought 

 into operation, the necessity arises for giving a precise and 

 definite interpretation of the powers which have been conferred 

 by enumeration on either the central or the local authorities. This 

 necessity, it need hardly be said, makes its appearance at a very 

 early stage in the history of every federation. Nor does it seem to 

 diminish as time goes on. Our own federation is ten years old. 

 We already have a by no means inconsiderable body of judicial 

 decisions, explaining and defining the nature and extent of the 

 enumerated powers of the Commonwealth. The United States Con- 

 stitution is 120 years old. Its Supreme Court is still busily occupied 

 in explaining and defining the nature and extent of the enumerated 

 powers of Congress. A century of carefully considered judicial 

 exposition of these powers has created a little island of certainty 



