FEDERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. 491 



which is strongly desired by the considered judgment of the com- 

 munity. American history furnishes not a few examples of 

 reforms which, desired by all parties, supported by all enlightened 

 public opinion, could not be secured because there was no single 

 authority with power to carry them into effect. A system which 

 can produce these results is something more than a mere check 

 upon democracy. It may sometimes amount to a clog upon the 

 wheels of government. Applying the test which was suggested 

 at the beginning of this paper, it may prevent the concentration 

 of the force of the community upon the attainment of an object 

 which the community deliberately desires. This defect of the 

 federal system is the more serious because the number of objects 

 which are now deemed to be within the legitimate sphere of 

 government is rapidly increasing. We have passed the days in 

 which the functions of the State were supposed to be limited to 

 the protection of life and property. We recognise that as the 

 State represents the organised will and force of the community 

 its business extends to the removal of every obstacle from, and 

 the provision of every facility for, the fullest self-realisation of its 

 <:onstituent members. 



The wider our conception of the functions of the State, the 

 more we shall realise the difficulties involved in a system which 

 prevents the concentration of its powers in a single sovereign 

 authority. 



Our first criticism on the federal system, therefore, is that 

 it tends to be inefficient, by reason of the division of governmental 

 powers. 



The second is that it tends to diminish the interest of citizens 

 in the business of government, and to weaken that sense of respon- 

 sibility, both in the legislator and the voter, which is the salt of 

 our whole political system. It also tends to divert attention from 

 the really important aspect of all legislation, the simple question 

 whether any proposed enactment is good or bad for the com- 

 munity. In other words, it does not altogether satisfy the second 

 of the requirements previously referred to as essential to a good 

 form of government. Nothing weakens the interest of citizens in 

 public affairs more quickly than the feeling that they cannot 

 effectively and with reasonable promptitude translate their 

 political ideals into fact. Constitutional obstacles to legislative 

 action, which the average man is apt to mistake for mere techni- 

 calities, breed impatience, and impatience may end in political 

 indifference — the one disease which democracy cannot survive. 

 This, of course, is not an argument against reasonable checks on 

 hasty or impulsive legislation. The federal system, as I men- 

 tioned a moment ago, is more than a check. It may involve, so 

 far as the ordinary working of the governmental machine is con- 

 cerned, an absolute inability on the part of any single organ of 

 government to carry out any desired change. Any artificial 

 barrier between the considered will of the community, and its 



