I'jgi. LITCrvARY INXELLIG!;:.'CERi 3;^ 



Fjrther explanations of the tendency of the 7- eg illations 

 propofcd in our lajl, vefpeBing hnprifonvient for Debt. 



It will esfily be perceived, that the two great point* 

 §imed at in the foregoing regulations are, to throw bars 

 in the way of wanton imprifonment of debtors ; and to 

 render it difficult for a bankrupt evei to live ineafe and 

 affluence until his juft debts ihall have been all paid. 



The only particular that will feem fingiilar, and will 

 be liable to be niifunderftood, is that regulation which 

 permits every individual creditor, after the bankrupt's 

 eiFects have been fold, and an equal dividend of the 

 price of them has been made among the whole, to ar- 

 reft the debtor's effefts, and to apply the price of them 

 towards the payment of his own debts only, without 

 communicating any part of it to the other creditors: 

 fome explanation of the reafons that fuggeiled that re- 

 gulation may therefore be neceiTary. 



It is found by experience, that where many perfona 

 are alike intereltcd in any tranfadtion, where the 

 value of the whole is much greater than-that of the 

 feparate parts, an individual feldom choofes to take up- 

 on liimfelf the difagreeable tafk of a profecutor, where 

 others are to be equally benefited by that profecution 

 as himfelf. On tliis account, it is found by experience, 

 that after a bankrupt's e5e£ts ha%'e been once fold, and 

 a dividend of them made, his creditors feldom ever 

 think of recovering any more from hijn at a future pe- 

 riod ; and therefore feldom hefitate about granting a 

 difcharge ; fo that, fhould the debtor, in a very lliort 

 time acquire affluence, his original creditors mufl be 

 content to bear thtir iofs witli patience. This circum- 

 ftance is no doubt carefully remarked by thofe who 

 have a fraudulent bankruptcy in view, the chance of 

 its taking j.lacc carefully computed, and their condud 



Vol. I. f T t 



