tiv historical chronicle. 



. These facts seem to indicate that some of the allied powers are not as se- 

 rious in their exertions as the interest of others would seem to require ; an< 

 that of course these others ought to look after their own interest in prefer- 

 rence to that of allies who are seemingly desirous of ftiifting the burden 

 from themselves. 



Termination of the war. 

 The object of the war against France, in as far as regards Britain, and 

 indeed all the allied powers, seems to be now in a great measure effected ; 

 and it is apparently the interest of all parties, if the profefsions with which 

 they began the war were sincere, now to think seriously of some mode by 

 which the grievances that ever must result from a state of warfare may 

 be averted. Those parties concerned, especially, who must have an interest 

 in preventing the dismemberment of France, which by weakening that na- 

 tion might t*nd to augment the power ot another so much as to indanger 

 the traiquillity of Europe, ought soon to interfere and withdraw their afsis- 

 tance, at least in aiding a plan of aggrandisement to those whom in a few- 

 years they may be forced to pull down again. Britain and Holland can 

 snrely have no interest in augmenting too much the power of Austria and 

 Prufsia. But fliould they hecdlefsly go forward at present in afsisting these 

 operations, and Ihould they indeavour to penetrate into theinteriorofFrance, 

 who ran say, in the present distracted state of that unhappy country, where 

 it may end ? On the one hand, fliould a man of political intrigue appear un- 

 der the auspices of these sovereigns, he might fall upon means of so mana- 

 ging parties in France, as to produce great revolutions, and of a more perma- 

 nent tendency than those which have lately taken place in that country. 

 On the other hand, fliould these powers suffer any great defeat, and this 

 no one will say is impofsible, it will draw us into an indefinite expence to 

 support them, and involve us in commercial dificulties that it is greatly 

 ttie interest of almost every individual in this country to avert. 



As to the difficulty aliout the mode of treating, though it be of some mo- 

 . ,«ient, it does not seem to be insurmountable. The generals of armies are 

 always understood to have a power of suspending hostilities on certain con- 

 ditions by truce, for a fliorter or longer time. There is little room to doubt 

 but the French at the present time would be glad to conclude a truce with 

 all the nations around them, for any definite time, on thecondicion that France 

 Caould not only rc-linquifh all the acquisitions flie had made from foreign 

 states, and allow the late conquest against them to remain uti pofsidetis ; 

 \\\\. would also agree to put into the hands of the allied powers one or more 

 fortified places to be held as cautionary towns, under the guarantee of those 

 q,f the allied powers that did not obtain pofsefsion of any, to be delivered 

 up to France, on a general peace, provisionally, when the government of 

 that country, (lionld be settled on such astable foundation, as that the pc'.\ ', 



