252 Some Speculations on the Nature of Instinct. 



one clay which may be pulled down the next, — whatever 

 may be the cause, — it is certain that, in an jera the most fa- 

 vourable for the arts and sciences, the philosophy of the 

 human mind has made very little advancement. The works 

 of Dugald Stewart, so pure, so elegant, and so profound, 

 will it is to be hoped awaken the attention of men of letters 

 to a science, in which the acquisition of truth more than a 

 hundred-fold repavs the labour of investigation. But with 

 all the deference and admiration which I sincerely feel for 

 the name and works of professor Stewart, yet I am not en- 

 tirely satisfied with the narrow limits he wishes to prescribe 

 to metaphysical speculation. "The legitimate province of 

 this department of philosophy," says Mr. S. " extends no 

 further than to conclusions resting on the solid basis of ob- 

 servation and experiment; and 1 have accordingly, in my 

 own inquiries, aimed at nothing more than to ascertain, 

 in the first place, the laws of our constitution, as far as they 

 can be discovered by attention to the subjects of our con- 

 sciousness, and afterwards to apply these laws as principles, 

 for the synthetical explanation of the more complicated 

 ph^enomena of the understanding*." This may be an ex- 

 cellent rule ; and it may be very philosophical to condemn 

 that premature inclination to generalize, which has given 

 to the world so many theories. Yet is it not to the love 

 for hypothesis that we owe what little metaphysical truth 

 ■we at present possess? Would Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 

 Priestley, Hartley, and many others, have ever written on 

 the philosophy of the mind, if they had not wished to bring 

 forward and support some favourite theory ? and should we: 

 ever have been favoured with the works of Dr. Reid and 

 Mr. Stewart, if they had had no theories to combat, no rub- 

 bish to clear away ? One man brings forward a hypothesis ; 

 another sits down with an intention to confute it, and to 

 advance one of his own which he thinks a better, and which 

 in all probability is to be overthrown in its turn. This 

 seems to have been the practice of metaphysicians in every 

 age, and it will be said that they have spent much time and 

 employed their talents to very little purpose. It may be so. 

 And yet, in the collision of different opinions, there have 

 certainly been struck many sparks of pure genuine truth, 

 sufficiently brilliant to excuse a great deal of error and 

 nonsense, and which but for hypothesis would never have 

 been seen. It frequently happens that, after much study 



* Philosophical Essays, Preliminary Diss. p. 3.; — See also several passages 

 to the same effect in the Introduction to his admirable work " Elements of 

 the Philosophy of the Human Mind." 



and 



