Some Speculations on the Nature of Instinct. 253 



and a patient attention to the operations of his own mind, 

 a philosopher feels himself dissatisfied with all theories both 

 ancient and modern ; and, beginning lo generalize, he forms 

 a hypothesis of his own, and to one principle perhaps 

 he refers all the phaenoniena of the human mind. This 

 may be philosophically wrong, but it is very natural; and 

 if any certain theory, without offending religion or com- 

 mon sense, can satisfactorily account for numerous phss- 

 nomena before unexplained, such a theory is surely not to 

 be rejected because it cannot be proved with the certainty 

 of a mathematical problem. *' Si la cause supposee ex- 

 plique tons les phenomenes connus; s'ils se reunissent tous 

 a un meme principe, comme autant de lignes dans un cen- 

 tre commun; si nous ne pouvons iniaginer d'autre prin- 

 cipe qui rende raison de tous ces phenomenes que celui-Ia, 

 nous devons tenir pour indubitable 1' existence de ce prin- 

 cipe *." It is very plain, that without attention " to the 

 subjects of our consciousness," no progress can be made in 

 the philosophy of the human mind ; but this attention is ia 

 some degree painful. After a tedious observation of men- 

 tal phsenoincna, men form a theory by way of relaxation, 

 (they wish to taste the wine before they have pressed the 

 grapes,) and, pleased with their own ingenuity, their hypo- 

 tliesis becomes a creed. This desire then of generalizing, 

 this propensity to form theories, — which no one feels more 

 than a student in metaphysics, — may and ought to he 

 controlled, but is not to.be too harshly censured nor too 

 much depressed; for^though hypothesis frequently proves 

 a dancing meteor which leads Its followers into bogs and 

 quagmires, yet it may by chance conduct us into the ritiht 

 road, and to a benighted traveller an)' light is better than 

 no light at all. 



Your valuable Magazine, which is the vehicle for papers 

 on every other science, has very seldom, I think, if ever, 

 contained a communication on the philosophy of the hu- 

 man mind. In your next number, if you permit me, I will 

 hizard a few observations on that principle which is olltd 

 Instinct, and which is considered by most people as a sort 

 of mechanical cause of action, both in man and the brute 

 creation. I shall he most happy if the remarks I shall 

 make awaken the attention of some other correspondent 

 wiser than myself, v/ho will have the goodness to correct 

 nie when I am wron<r, or to treat the subject himself in a 

 more satisfactory manner. At any rale, there is no iiarm in 



• Ency. Fran, arlicle Aine, p. 73. 



ofTering 



