352 Some Specutalions on the Kalurc <ij instinci. 



as well without them, and they neither serve to make us 

 really wiser, ijor more contoiUed." — That &uch is a common 

 opinion among those who think at all upon the subject of 

 instinct, will, 1 think, not be denied. 



Instinct, according to Dr. Reid, is a natural blind im- 

 pulse to certain actions, vvithout having any end in view ; 

 without delii)cration, and very often wiihout anv conception 

 of what we do. It has again been defined to be a tendency 

 implanted ni the mind of animals, when under the influence 

 of certain leelings or sensations, to perform spontaneously, 

 xinerringlv, independently of all teaching and experience, 

 and without any determinate view to consequences, certain 

 actions necessary for the preservation of the individual, and 

 the continuance of the kind(l). The latter definition ap- 

 pears to be a very just one ; and there is not the least doubt, 

 that many actions, both of men and brutes, are performed 

 under this mysterious tendency. No action, perhaps, is 

 more decidedly instinctive, than the sucking of the nev/- 

 born lamb. This little animal is never thought to have 

 any distinct idea that its mother's milk is necessary for its 

 existence, nor is it ever suspected to know by inductive phi- 

 losophy that if it does not suck it will inevitably die; but 

 it evidently acts under the uncontrollable influence of a 

 certain law, which impels to the teat the voung of every 

 animal, whether a lion's cub or the offspring of a wo- 

 man. If the analogy between a wolf and a man could only 

 be traced in their alike acting from a principle whose ope- 

 ration is in both involuntary, and as unerring as the law of 

 gravitation, the common opinion of men concerning the 

 brutes would undoubtedly be just. Exclusively distin- 

 guished by the gift of reasoh, we might then look down 

 from an immense height on the lower animals ; deny, with 

 Descartes, that they possess a soul ; and with him consider 

 them as mere autouiatons, moved by clock-work. But are 

 we authorized by the mental phrenomena which the actions 

 of brutes daily exhibit, to deny that they possess a soul as 

 well as ourselves? Soul is a word by which we understand 

 that jirinciple in man which possesses consciousness, a 

 power of perception, memory, intelligence, and vo!ition(2). 

 'J'hat faculty of the soul which chiefly dislinouishes man from 

 the brute creation, is that of reason, or a power of drawing 

 conclusions, from a comparison of our ideas, by which to 

 regulate our actions. But a very short observation of the 

 manners of the brute creation would, ooe should imagine, 

 convince every one, that the lower animals act from reason 

 as well as ourselves. To prove lliisj iununierable instances 



niisiht 



