406 Some Speculations on the Analogy lelween 



Language being entirely relative to objects with which we 

 are surroundedj and which we call material, it is impossible 

 to build any hypothesis on the nature or essence of the soul, 

 without conveying to the reader an idea ot a material sub- 

 ^stance; and it appears to me of little consequence, whether 

 we imagine the soul to be material or immaterial. What 

 is meant by ihe word spirit ? It will be answered. An im- 

 material something in which thinking is inherent. But 

 what reason have we for supposing that this something, 

 this soul; may not be a portion of sublilt matter ? — not a 

 medullary substance like the brain, or a combination of 

 particles similar to those which compose our bodies; such 

 matter is divisible, undergoing changes every moment, and 

 by its nature liable to corruption : but can we suppose no 

 matter with extension, but indivisible and incorruptible? 

 Is it impossible for such a substance to exist ? It is indeed 

 plain, that the idea of corporeal substance is as remote 

 from our conception, as ihal of spiritual substance, or 

 spirit. We conclude that the operations of the mind, 

 thinking, reasoning, &c. cannot subsist of themselves, nor 

 can we apprehend how they can belong to body, or be 

 produced by it. We therefore think these the actions of 

 some other substance, which we call spirit. Of matter we 

 have no other idea or notion, but something wherein those 

 many sensible qualities which affect our senses, to subsist. 

 We have, therefore, as clear a notion of the substance of 

 spirit, as we have of body ; the one being supposed to be 

 (without knowing what it is) the substratum to those sim- 

 ple ideas we have from without, and the other (with a like 

 ignorance'of what it is) to be llie substratum to those ope- 

 rations which we experience in ourselves within*. Again, 

 "The immediate objects of sense, philosophers have agreed 

 to term qualities, which they conceive as inhering in some- 

 thing which is called their subject, or substratum. It is 

 this substratum of sensible qualities, which in the language 

 of philosophy is denominated matter: so that matter is 

 not that which we immediately see and handle, .but the 

 concealed subject or support of visible tangible qualiiiesf." 

 Spirit and matter, therefore, are merely an arbitrary union 

 of certain letters, to sis;nify two substratums, or two some- 

 things, we know not what, on which to rest certain quali- 

 ties : — But is it imi)ossible to suppose a third substratum 

 to exist, supporting a union of qualities drawn frum tho 

 two former? Let us imagine a something, to which belong 



• Locke's Essay. f Ency. Brit, article M'illcr. 



all 



