254 An Essay on Dreaming, including 



Professor Stewart's explanation is altogether psychological, but, 

 however ingenious, is not even satisfactory to himself. He main- 

 tains " that all our mental operations which are independent of 

 our will, may continue during sleep ; and that the plijenomena 

 of dreaming may perhaps be produced by these, diversified in 

 their apparent effects in consequence of the suspension of our- 

 voluntary powers *." " That the same laws of association, 

 which regulate the train of our thoughts while we are awake, con- 

 tinue to operate during sleep ; but the influence of the will being 

 suspended, all our voluntary operations, such as recollection, 

 reasoning, cScc. must also be suspended f." 



To this hypothesis he tells us that Mr. Thomas Browne and 

 Mr. Prevost offered one and the same objection, viz. That un- 

 less the will were active, there couid be no effort of attention, 

 and without such an effort, there could be no recollection : yet 

 we recollect our dreams, although the hypothesis supposes that 

 in sleep the will does not operate. Professor Stewart expresses 

 himself sensible of the force of this objection, and acknowledges 

 that he is far from being satisfied that it is in his power to recon- 

 cile completely the apparent inconsistency. He, however, adopts 

 a solution offered by IVIr. Prevost, viz. that in perfect sleep there 

 is no recollection ; and that when we remember our dreams, our 

 sleep has not been perfect. And he adds, that in bodily indis- 

 position, the disturbed state of our rest may prevent the total 

 cessation of the power of attention, which may enable us after- 

 wards to retrace our dreams, or some accidental association may 

 renew the train of ideas ; and if we are satisfied that they once 

 passed through our mind, vet not during our waking moments, 

 we have no other alternative but to regard them as a dream ];. 



This last observation can scarcely be controverted. On awak- 

 ing in the morning, we naturally advert to the occupations which 

 are to employ us during the day, and the persons with whom we 

 wish or expect to communicate. The moment they occur in our 

 reflections, we perhaps recollect that we have been dreaming of 

 them. But surely tbis is only an argument that our sleeping 

 thoughts are recalled, like our waking, by the association of our 

 ideas. It neither proves nor disproves his hypothesis. If the 

 influence of the will, and the exercise of attention, may be sus- 

 pended during t.ie course of those thoughts which pass through 

 our mind while asleep, and which yet may be recalled by the 

 force of association, so may they be suspended also during our 

 waking thoughts, and with a similar result. But, if they he neces- 

 sary to our recollection in one case, they must in the other. 



Philosophy of the human Mind, octavo, p. 333. f ^^' i''- 



Id. note O. 



With 



