APPENDIX TO PART FTRST. 11 



by the aid of right reason. It is only with this portion of international 

 law that we need now concern ourselves. That other portion which 1 have 

 already described as international only in its objects, and strictly 

 national and municipal in its creation and sanctions, springs from the 

 same sources whence all of the internal law ot a particular State arises — 

 from legislatures and the decisions ot courts. We will then briefly con- 

 sider these principal sources, or, if I may use the expression, fountains 

 from which flow the streams of the jus inter gentes. 



Sec. 33. (2) Reason. But the precepts of the moral law, either as con- 

 tained in the written word, or as felt in the consciousness of the human 

 race, are statements of broad, general principles; they are the germs, 

 the fructifying powers; they must be developed, must be cast in a more 

 practical and dogmatic form to meet the countless demands of each in- 

 dividual, and of the societies we call nations. To this end we must 

 appeal to reason; and hence the second source which I have mentioned, 

 namely, enlightened reason acting upon the abstract principles of 

 morality. I can not now stop to illustrate this proposition ; we shall 

 meet many pertinent examples in the course of our investigations. I 

 wish now, however, to dwell upon one fact of great importance — a fact 

 which will help you to avoid many difficulties, to reconcile many dis- 

 crepancies, to solve many uncertaincies. This fact is, that an interna- 

 tional law is mainly based upon the general principles of pure morality, 

 and as its particular rules are mainly drawn therefrom, or are intended 

 to be drawn therefrom, by reason, it is, as ;i science, the most progres- 

 sive of any department of jurisprudence or legislation. The improve- 

 ment of civilized nations in culture and refinement, the more complete 

 understanding of rights and duties, the growing appreciation of the 

 truth that what is right is also expedient, have told, and still do tell, 

 upon it with sudden and surprising effect. 



The result is that doctrines which were universally received a gener- 

 ation since are as universally rejected now; that precedents which 

 were universally considered as binding a quarter of a century ago 

 would at the present be passed by as without force, as acts which 

 could not endure the light of more modern investigation. More par- 

 ticularly is this true in respect to the rules which define the rights of 

 belligerents and neutrals. The latest works of European jurists are, 

 as we shall see, conceived in a far different spirit from standard treat- 

 ises of the former generation. It was the entire ignoring or forgetful- 

 ness of this evident and most benign fact by Mr. Senator Sumner, 

 in the celebrated and elaborate speech which he delivered a few years 

 since upon the international policy of England, that rendered the 

 speech utterly useless as an argument, exposed it to the criticism of 

 European jurists, and left it only a monument of unnecessary labor in 

 raking up old precedents from history, which no civilized nation of our 

 own day would quote or rely upon. 



The Roman law, that wonderful result of reason working upon a basis 

 of abstract right, is largely appealed to in international discussions, as 

 containing rules which, at least by analogy, may serve to settle inter- 

 national disputes. No one can be an accomplished diplomatist without 

 a familiar acquaintance with much of this immortal code. 



[Pliillimore. International law, 1871, ch. Ill, pages 14-28.] 



XIX. * * * What are in fact the fountains of international 

 jurisprudence?" * * * 



XX. Grotius enumerates these sources as being u vpsa natiira, leges 

 divincu, mores, et pacta." 



