APPENDIX TO PART FIRST. 19 



independently of all legislation of all human institutions, and it is one 

 for all nations. It governs peace and war, and traces the rights and 

 duties of every position. The rights which it gives are clear, positive, 

 and absolute; they are of such a nature as to reciprocally limit each 

 other without ever coming into collision or contradiction with each 

 other; they are correlative to each other, and are coordinated and 

 linked with the most perfect harmony. It can not be otherwise. He 

 who has arranged all the parts of the universe in so admirable a man- 

 ner, the Creator of the world, could not contradict himself. 



The natural law is, from its very nature, always obligatory. The 

 treaties which recall its provisions and regulate their application must 

 necessarily have the same perpetuity, since, even if they should cease 

 to exist, the principles would not cease to be executory just as they 

 were when the stipulations were in force. * * * 



Certain usages have become established among civilized nations 

 without ever having been written in any treaty, and without ever hav- 

 ing formed the subject of any special and express agreement. These 

 usages, few in number, in harmony with primitive law, whose applica- 

 tion they serve to regulate, form a part of international law which might 

 be called the law of custom; it seems to me preferable to consider them 

 as a part of secondary law. 



[From " Le Droit de la Nature et des Gens," par le Baron de Pnfendorf, traduit du 

 Latin par Jean Barbeyrac. 5th ed., Vol. 1, Book 2, chap. 3, sec. 23, pages 243 et seq. 

 Translation.] 



Finally, we must further examine here, whether there is a positive 

 law of nations, different from the natural law. Learned men are not 

 well agreed on this subject. Many think that the natural law and the 

 law of nations are, in point of fact, but one and the same thing, and 

 that they differ in name only. Thus, Hobbes divides the natural law 

 into natural law of man and natural law of states. The latter, in his 

 opinion, is what is called the law of nations. "The maxims," adds he, 

 " of both these laws are precisely the same; but as states, as soon as 

 they are found, acquire, to a certain extent, personal characteristics, 

 the same law that is called natural, when the duties of private indi- 

 viduals are mentioned, is called the law of nations when reference is 

 made to the whole body of a state or nation." 



I fully subscribe to this view, and I recognize no other kind of volun- 

 tary or positive international law, at least none having force of law, prop- 

 erly so called, and binding upon nations as emanating from a superior. 

 There is, in fact, no variance between our opinion and that of certain 

 learned men who regard that which is in harmony with a reasonable 

 nature as belonging to natural law, and that which is based upon our 

 needs, which can not be better provided for than by the laws of socia- 

 bility, as belonging to the law of nations. For we maintain simply that 

 there is ho positive law of nations that is dependent upon the will of 

 a superior. And that which is a consequence of the needs of human 

 nature should, in my opinion, be referred to the natural law. If we 

 have not thought proper to base this law upon the agreement of the 

 things which are its object, with a reasonable nature, this was in order 

 not to establish in reason itself the rule of the maxims of reason, and to 

 avoid the circle to which is reduced the demonstration of the natural 

 laws by this method. 



Moreover, the majority of the things which the Koman jurisconsults 

 and the great body of learned men refer to the law of nations, such 



