24 ARGUMENT OY THE UNITED STATES. 



Investigating thus this spirit of law, we find the definition of inter- 

 national law to consist in certain rules of conduct which reason, prompted 

 by conscience, deduces as consonant to justice, with such limitations and 

 modifications as may be established by general consent, to meet the exigen- 

 cies of the present state of society as existing among nations and which 

 modern civilized states regard as binding than in their relations with one 

 another, with a force comparable in nature and degree to that binding the 

 conscientious person to obey the laics of his country. 



[From " Le Droit Public International Maritime," par Carlos Testa (Portuguese), 

 translated by H. Houtiron, 1886, part i, chap. 1, pages 4ii et ■seq.] 



Force may constitute, in physical matters, the superiority of one in- 

 dividual over another; but reason and conscience establish, in moral 

 matters, other means which are controlled by the notion of duty and 

 right. It is the whole body of these precepts, which are just, neces- 

 sary, and immutable, for every reasoning being, and graven by God in 

 the human conscience, that constitutes the natural or primitive law. 

 The object of a law regulating the conduct of men is to impose moral 

 obligations or to authorize certain acts from which advantages may 

 result. 



In the former case the law establishes the duty; in the latter it con- 

 siders the right. The natural or primitive law, when it designates the 

 duties that it imposes, at once establishes the correlative duties which 

 are its outgrowth, and which constitute the principles of natural or 

 primitive law. 



The science of natural law is therefore based upon the principles of 

 that intuitive law which, while giving the ability to practice that which 

 is morally just, establishes the principles to be observed in the relations 

 between one individual and another for the different hypotheses of 

 social life. 



Duty is a matter of precept, while right is optional; yet right and 

 duty are essentially correlative; and in the reciprocal relations between 

 one individual and another, that which constitutes a duty for one, 

 establishes a right for another. The same is the case in the mutual 

 relations of collective bodies. 



It is an axiom which results from the study of the moral nature of 

 man that alone and isolated he cannot attain his welfare, and that 

 sociability is a condition which is by nature necessary to enable him to 

 attain his highest advantage. This natural cause lias produced the 

 family, a social element which determines the formation of nations. 



Now, natural law, which is essentially connected with human nature, 

 and which prescribes certain principles that are to control the recip- 

 rocal relations between one individual and another, is likewise and for 

 the same reason applicable to the relations existing among collective 

 bodies of individuals, which constitute so many moral entities. It is, 

 therefore, the common law of association — that is to say, of nationali- 

 ties. 



This application of the precepts of natural law, which obliges nations 

 to practice the same duties that it prescribes for individuals, consti- 

 tutes the law of nations, which, when considered according to its origin 

 (which is based upon natural law), is also called the primitive or neces- 

 sary law of nations. 



Respect for the law of nations is consequently as obligatory among 

 nations as is respect for natural law among individuals. 



From the fact that the various civil societies which form nations or 

 states, are independent, it results that the internal laws which consti- 

 tute the public law of some can not be extended to the others — that is to 



