26 ARGUMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 



ture itself, not applied to men, considered simply as such, but to nations, 



States, or their chiefs, in the relations they have together, and the 



several interests they have to manage between each other. 



VI. There is no room to question the reality and certainty of such a 



law of nations obligatory of its own nature, and to which nations, or the 



sovereigns that rule them, ought to submit. For if God by means of 



right reason imposes certain duties between individuals, it is evident he 



is likewise willing that nations, which arc only human societies, should 



observe the same duties between themselves. (See ch. v, sec. 8.) 

 ####### 



Sec. IX. * * * There is certainly an universal, necessary, and 

 self obligatory law of nations, which differs in nothing from the law of 

 nature, and is consequently immutable, insomuch that the people or 

 sovereigns can not dispense with it, even by common consent, without 

 transgressing their duty. There is, besides, another law of nations 

 which we may call arbitrary and free, as founded only on an express or 

 tacit convention, the effect of which is not of itself universal, being 

 obligatory only in regard to those who have voluntarily submitted 

 thereto, and only so long as they please, because they are alw T ays at 

 liberty to change or repeal it. To this we must likewise add that the 

 whole force of this sort of law of nations ultimately depends on the 

 law of nature, which commands us to be true to our engagements. 

 Whatever really belongs to the law of nations may be reduced to one 

 or other of these two species; and the use of this distinction will easily 

 appeal 1 by applying it to particular questions which relate either to 

 war, for example, to ambassadors, or to public treaties, and to the de- 

 ciding of disputes which sometimes arise concerning these matters 

 between sovereigns. 



Sec. X. It is a point of importance to attend to the origin and nature 

 of the law of nations, such as we have now explained them. For, be- 

 sides that it is always advantageous to form just ideas of things, this 

 is still more necessary in matter of practice and morality. It is owing 

 perhaps to our distinguishing the law of nations from natural law, that 

 we have insensibly accustomed ourselves to form quite a different judg- 

 ment between the actions of sovereigns and those of private people. 

 Nothing is more usual than to see men condemned in common for things 

 which we praise, or at least excuse in the persons of princes. And yet 

 it is certain as we have already shown, that the maxims of the law of 

 nations have an equal authority with those of the law of nature, and are 

 equally respectable and sacred, because they have God alike for their 

 author. In short, there is only one sole and the same rule of justice 

 for all mankind. Princes who infringe the law of nations commit as 

 great a crime as private people who violate the law of nature; and if 

 there be any difference in the two cases, it must be charged to the 

 prince's account, whose unjust actions are always attended with more 

 dreadful consequences than those of private people. 



Other citations might be added almost indefinitely. The following 

 references may be added: 



F. de Martens, Int. Law, Paris, 1S83, Vol. 1, pages 19, 20; Li. E. P. 

 Tuparelli d'Azeglio, de la Compagnie de Jesus, Traduit de l'ltalien, 

 deux ed. tome ii, ch. 2 5 Grotius De Jure, Belli ac Pacis, Proleg; Ileff- 

 ter, Int. Law of Europe, page 2; Bluntschli, Le Droit Int. Codifie, 

 pages L 2: Pasquale Fiore, book 1, ch. 1; Ahrens, Course of Natural 

 Law and The Philosophy of Law, Vol. n, book in, ch. 1 ; M. G. Masse, 

 Commercial Law in its Relations to the Law of Nations, etc., Paris, 

 1874, book 1, Lib. n, ch. 1, page 33; Louis Renault, Introduction a 

 l'Etude du Droit International, Paris, 1879, pages 13, 14. 



