WHAT LAW IS TO GOVERN THE DECISION 



traria. m And it is very clearly illustrated by the fact that the great 

 expositors of the Roman law in seeking- for a concise formula which 

 would express its original and fundamental principles, have simply 

 borrowed or framed a statement of the dictates of natural justice: 

 " Juris prec&pta sunt hoec: Jwnesta • vivere, alterum non kedere, suit in 

 cuique tribuere." 2 



Some writers have been inclined to question the propriety of designat- 

 ing as law that body of principles and rules which it is asserted are 

 binding upon nations, for the reason that there is no common superior 

 power which may be appealed to for their enforcement. But this is a 

 superficial view which has received no considerable assent. The pub- 

 lic opinion of the civilized world is a power to which all nations are 

 forced to submit. No nation can afford to take up arms in defence of 

 an assertion which is pronounced by that opinion to be erroneous. A 

 recent writer of established authority has well answered this objection: 



It is sometimes said that there can be no law between nations, 

 because they acknowledge no common superior authority, no interna- 

 tional executive capable of enforcing the precepts of international law. 

 This objection admits of various answers: First, it is a matter of fact 

 that states and nations recognize the existence and independence of 

 each other, and out of a recognized society of nations, as out of a society 

 of individuals, law must necessarily spring. The common rules of right 

 approved by nations as regulating their intercourse are of themselves, 

 as has been shown, such a law. Secondly, the contrary position con- 

 founds two distinct things, namely, the physical sanction which law 

 derives from being enforced by superior power, and the moral sanction 

 conferred on it by the fundamental principle of right; the error is 

 similar in kind to that which has led jurists to divide moml obliga- 

 tions into perfect and imperfect. All moral obligations are equally 

 perfect, though the means of compelling their performance is, humanly 

 speaking, more or less perfect, as they more or less fall under the cog- 

 nizance of human law. In like manner, international justice would 

 not be less deserving of that appellation if the sanctions of it were 

 wholly incapable of being enforced. 



####### 



But irrespectively of any such means of enforcement the law must 

 remain. God has willed the society of States as He has willed the so- 

 ciety of individuals. The dictates of the conscience of both may be 

 violated on earth, but to the national as to the individual conscience, 

 the language of a profound philosopher is applicable: " Hadit strength 

 as it had right, had it power as it has manifest authority, it would ab- 

 solutely govern the world." 



Lastly, it may be observed on this head, that the history of the 

 world, and especially of modern times, has been but incuriously and 

 unprontably read by him who has not perceived the certain Nemesis 

 which overtakes the transgressors of international justice; for, to take 



1 Cic. De Legibus, Lib. I, c. VI, § 6. . 2 Just. I, 1. 3. 



