44 ARGUMENT 01' THE UNITED STATES. 



(J rent Britain. In the case of Davies vs. Powell (Willes, 46) the ques- 

 tion was whether deer kept in an inclosure were distrainable for rent. 

 The court took notice of the nature and habits of these animals as 

 affected by the care and industry of man and the uses which they were 

 ■made to subserve; and it observed that, while they were formerly kept 

 principally for pleasure and not for profit, the practice had arisen of 

 caring - for them and rearing and selling them, and, in view of these 

 facts, declared that they had become " as much a sort of husbandry as 

 horses, cows, sheep, or any other cattle." 



And, more recently, the question was made in the case of Morgan v. 

 The Earl of Abergavenny (8 C. B., 7G8), whether deer thus kept 

 passed upon the death of the owner to the heir or to the executor; that 

 is to say, whether they were personal property or chattels real. Evidence 

 was received upon the trial showing the nature and habits of the ani- 

 mals; that they were cared for and fed and selections made from them for 

 slaughter; and upon this evidence it was left to the jury to say whether 

 they were personal property. The jury found that they were; and the 

 court upon a review of the case approved the verdict, holding that the 

 question was justly made to depend upon the facts which had been 

 given in evidence. 



Inasmuch as the present controversy upon this point is one between 

 nations, it can not be determined by a reference to the municipal law of 

 either, or by the municipal law of any nation. The rule of decision 

 must be found in international law; and, as has already been shown, if 

 there is no actual practice or usage of nations directly in point, as there 

 is not, recourse must be had to the principles upon which international 

 law is founded — that is to say, to the law of nature. But the question 

 whether a particular thing is the subject of property, as between nations? 

 is substantially the same as the question whether the same thing is 

 property as between individuals in a particular nation. Now, it so 

 happens that this latter question has been determined, whenever it 

 has arisen, not by any exercise of legislative power, but by an adoption 

 of the rule of the law of nature, And the municipal jurisprudence of 

 all nations, proceeding upon the law of nature, is everywhere in sub- 

 stantial accord upon the question what things are the subject of prop 

 erty. That jurisprudence, therefore, so far as it is consentaneous, may 

 be invoked in this controversy, as directly evidencing the law of na- 

 ture, and, therefore, of nations. 



Proceeding to the examination of the doctrines of this municipal 



