PROPERTY IN THE ALASKAN SEAL HERD. 51 



monly said to be the right to the exclusive possession, use, and disposi- 

 tion of the thing which is the subject of it; but this defines rather the 

 right upon which property rests, than property itself. The somewhat 

 abstract definition of Savigny more precisely states what property 

 really is. "Property," says he, "according to its true nature, is a 

 widening of individual power." 1 It is, as far as tangible things are 

 concerned, an extension of the individual to some part of the material 

 world, so that it is affected by his personality. 2 



But whence comes the right of the individual to thus extend his 

 power over the natural world, and what are its conditions and limita- 

 tions'? In thus speaking of rights, moral rights alone are intended, 

 for the law knows of no other, if, indeed, any other exist. There are 

 no natural indefeasible rights which stand for their own reason. Ii 

 rights exist, it is not for themselves alone, but because they subserve 

 the happiness of mankind and the purposes for which the human race 

 was placed upon the earth. Even the right to life, however clear in 

 general, is not natural and indefeasible. It is held subject to the needs 

 of mankind, and in a great number of cases may be justly taken by 

 society. In order to ascertain the source and foundation of the right 

 of property, we must look, as all moralists and jurists look, to the 

 nature of man and the environment in which he is placed. We find 

 that the desire of exclusive possession is one of the original and prin- 

 cipal facts of man's nature which will and must be gratified, even though 

 force be employed to vindicate the possession. We know, also, that 

 man is a social animal and must live in society, and that there can not 

 be any society without order and peace. Even in savage life it is a 

 necessity that the hunter should have the exclusive ownership of the 

 beast he has slain for food and of the weapon he has made for the chase. 

 Otherwise life itself could not be maintained. His rude society, even, 

 is not possible unless it furnishes him with some guaranty that these 

 few possessions be secured to him. Otherwise he is at war with his 

 species, and society is gone. The existence of property, to at least this 

 extent, is coeval with the existence of man. It stands upon the imperi- 



1 Jurid. Relations (Lond., 1834, Ratteguiu's Trans.), p. 178. 



3 Locke expresses the same idea: "The fruit or venison which nourishes the wild 

 Indian * * * must he his, and so his, i. e., a part of him, that another can no 

 longer have any right to it," etc. (Civil Government, Ch. v, § 25.) 



"In making the ohject my own I stamped it with the mark of my own person; 

 whoever attacks it attacks me; the hlow struck it strikes me, for I am present in it. 

 Property is but the periphery of my person extended to tluugs." Ihering, quoted 

 by George B. Newcomb, Pol. Science Quarterly, vol. 1, p. 604. 



