PROPERTY IN THE ALASKAN SEAL HERD. 97 



would thus be set up as a right? It is simply and without qualification 

 a right to destroy oue of the gifts of nature to man. It would be say- 

 ing, not to the United States alone, but to the whole world, "You shall 

 no longer have this blessing which was originally bestowed upon you — 

 this opportunity which nature affords to secure the preservation of the 

 source of a blessing and make it permanently available shall not be 

 improved; and if you ask us for a reason we give you none, except 

 that we so choose, and can, for a few years at least, make a profit to our- 

 selves by carrying on the work of destruction; the sea is free." 



Ahrens 1 states: The definitions of the right of property given by 

 positive laws generally concede to the owner the power to dispose 

 of his object in an almost absolute manner, to use and abuse it, and 

 even through caprice to destroy it; 2 but this arbitrary power is not in 

 keeping with natural law, and positive legislation, obedient to the voice 

 of common sense and reason in the interest of society, has been 

 obliged itself to establish numerous restrictions, which, examined from 

 a philosophic view of law, are the result of rational principles to which 

 the right of property and its exercise are subjected. 



The principles which govern socially the right of property relate to 

 substance and to form. 



I. As to substance, the following rules may be established: 



1. Property exists for a rational purpose and for a rational use; it 

 is destined to satisfy the various needs of human life; consequently, 

 all arbitrary abuse, all arbitrary destruction, are contrary to right (droit) 

 and should be prohibited by law (loi). But to avoid giving a false ex- 

 tension to this principle, it is important to recall to mind that, accord- 

 ing to personal rights, that which is committed within the sphere of 



the soil to retain the soil itself as well as the surface. Otherwise he will use the 

 soil as a possessor who is in haste to enjoy it. Where a thought of the future is 

 wanting there will he no real improvement, no numerous and well-supported pop- 

 ulation, no civilization with deep roots either moral or material." 



* * * "All these advantages can l»o the outgrowth of nothing hut permanent 

 ownership. For the same reason it is well for ownership to he individual and not 

 collective; of this we find proof in the religious communities of the middle ages, 

 and in our own time in the very imperfect condition of property held in common. 

 Collective ownership is attended with this drawback, viz, that it docs not sul'fi- 

 oiently stimulate the activity of the owner." 



8 Ahrens: Course of Natural Law, Leipzic, 1870, vol. 2, hook I, div. 1, sec 64. 



2 Roman law gave the owner the jus utendi et abutendi ; after the Austrian code 

 (11, 2, sec. 3G2), he has the power to destroy arbitrarily that which belongs to him. 

 The Code Napoleon which defines property as "the right to enjoy and to dispose of 

 things in the most absolute manner, provided no use he made of them forbidden 

 by the laws or by the regulations," interposed social interest by this restriction. 



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