144 ARGUMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 



Tlie right of self-defense by a nation upon the sea, and the right of 

 municipal jurisdiction over a limited part of the sea adjacent to the 

 coast, are not to be confounded, for the two are totally distinct. The 

 littoral jurisdiction, indeed, is only a branch of the general right of 

 self-defense, accorded by usage and common consent: first, because it 

 is always necessary for self-protection, and next, because it is usually 

 sufficient for it. Upon no other ground was it ever attempted to be 

 sustained. That jurisdiction must be limited by an ascertained or 

 ascertainable line, is its necessary condition. That the right of self- 

 defense is subject to no territorial line, is equally plain. All rights 

 of self defense are the result of necessity. They are co-extensive with 

 the necessity tliat gives rise to them, and can be restricted by no 

 other boundary. As remarked by Chief Justice Marshall, "All that is 

 uecessary to this object is lawful, all that transcends it is unlawful." 



Precisely what is the limit of jurisdiction upon the littoral sea, and 

 precisely what are the nature and extent of the jurisdiction that can be 

 asserted within it, whether it is absolute or qualified, territorial or 

 extraterritorial, are questions that have been the subject of grave dif- 

 ference of opinion among jurists. Nor have they ever been entirely 

 settled. They will be found to be discussed with a fullness of learning, 

 a depth of research, and a masterly power of reasoning, to which noth- 

 ing can be added, in the opinions of the English judges in the important 

 and leading case of The Queen v. Kehn (2 Law Eep. Exch. Div., 1870-77, 

 pp. 03 to 239). These learned and eminent judges were not fortunate 

 enough to agree upon all the questions involved, and every view that 

 can be taken of them, and every consideration that is pertinent, are ex- 

 haustively presented in their opinions. 



Upon these vexed questions it is not at all necessary to enter in the 

 present case, for they have little to do with it. Whether the conclu- 



through a sort of extension of the idea of self-prescrvatiou to include self-protection 

 against serious hurts, states are allowed to disregard certain of the ordinary rules 

 of law, in the same manner as if their existence were involved." (Hall, Int. Law, 

 chap. 7, sec. 83.) 



"If a nation is obliged to preserve itself, it is no less obliged carefully to preserve 

 all its members. The nation owes this to itself, since the loss even of one of its 

 members weakens it and is injurious to its preservation. It owes this also to the 

 members in particular, in consequence of the very act of association; for those who 

 compose a nation are united for their defense and common advantage, and none can 

 justly be deprived of this union and of the advantages he expects to derive from it, 

 while he, on his side, fulfills the couditions. The body of a nation can not, then, 

 abandon a province, a town, or even a, single individual who is a part of it, unless 

 compelled to it by necessity or indispensably obliged to it by the strongest reasons 

 founded on the public safety." (Vattel, see. 17.) 



