EIGHT TO PROTECT INTERESTS AND INDUSTRY. 145 



sions of one or the other of these conflicting opinions are to be ac- 

 cepted, is immaterial here. All authorities agree that the sole reason 

 upon which a certain right of jurisdiction upon the sea, and within a 

 limit that is variously stated, has been conceded to maritime nations, 

 is found in the necessities of self-defense. This part of the dominion 

 over the sea, whether it be greater or less, has never been surrendered. 

 It is a remnant of the former more extended dominion, retained for the 

 same reason for which that was asserted. Lord Chief Justice Cock- 

 bnrn, in his opinion in the case just cited, reviews the history of this 

 subject, quoting the language of every previous writer of repute, and 

 referring to every judicial decision respecting it which then existed. 

 He points out very clearly the different views that have prevailed and 

 which then prevailed as to the nature of the jurisdiction, and as to the 

 distance over which it could be extended. This limit has been vari- 

 ously asserted by writers of distinction and authority, at two days' 

 sail, one hundred miles, sixty miles, the horizon line, as far as can be 

 seen from the shore, as far as bottom can be found with the dead line, 

 the range of a cannon shot, two leagues, one league, or so tar as the 

 Government might think necessary. 1 



On the other point, the character of the jurisdiction, it may be 

 assumed that by the controlling opinion of the present time, and by 



1 The lord ch'ef justice observes: "From tlie review of these authorities wo 

 arrive at the following results: There can bo no doubt that the suggestion of Byn- 

 kershoek that the sea surrounding the coast to the extent of cannon range should bo 

 treated as belonging to the state owning the coast, has, with but very few excep- 

 tions, been accepted and adopted by the publicists who have followed him during 

 the last two centuries. But it is equally clear in the practical application of the 

 rule in the respect of the particular of distance, as also in the still more essential 

 particular of the character of sovereignty and dominion to bo exercised, great dif- 

 ferences of opinion have prevailed and still continue to exist. As regards distance, 

 while the majority of authors have adhered to the three-mile zone, others, like M. 

 Ortolan and Mr. Halleck, applying with greater consistency the principle on which 

 the whole doctrine rests, insist on extending the distance to the modern range of 

 cannon — in other words, doubling it. This difference of opinion may be of little 

 practical importance in the present circumstances, inasmuch as the place at which 

 the offense occurred was within the lesser distance; but it is nevertheless not imma- 

 terial as showing how unsettled this doctrine still is. The question of sovereignty, 

 on the other hand, is all important, and here we have every sliado of opinion. 

 * * Looking at this we may properly ask those who contend for the application 

 of the existing law to the littoral sea, independently of legislation, to tell us the 

 extent to which we are to go in applying it. Are we to limit it to three miles, or to 

 ex bend it to six? Are we to treat the whole body of the criminal law as applicable 

 to it, or only so much as relates to police and safety ? Or are we to limit it, as one 

 of these authors proposes, to the protection of fisheries and customs, tho exacting 

 of harbor and like dues, and the protection of our coasts in time of war? Which 

 of these writers are we to follow 1" 



14749 10 



