148 ARGUMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 



Vattel says upon this subject (p. 128, sec. 289): 



Tt is not easy to determine to what distance the nation may extend its 

 rights over the sea by which it is surrounded. * * * Each state may 

 on this head make what regulation it pleases so far as respects the trans- 

 actions of the citizens with each other, or their concerns with the sov- 

 ereign; but, between nation and nation, all that can reasonably be said 

 is that in general the dominion of the state over the neighboring seas 

 extends as far as her safety renders it necessary, and her power is able 

 to assert it. 



Chancellor Kent observes (1 Com., p. 29): 



It is difficult to draw any precise or determinate conclusion amidst 

 the variety of opinions as to the distance to which a state may law- 

 fully extend its exclusive dominion over the sea adjoining its territories 

 and beyond those portions of the sea which are embraced by harbors, 

 gulfs, bays, and estuaries, and over which its jurisdiction unquestion- 

 ably extends. All that can reasonably be asserted is, that the domin- 

 ion of the sovereign of the shore over the contiguous sea extends as 

 far as is requisite for his safety and for some lawful end. 



And states may exercise a more qualified jurisdiction over the seas 

 near their const tor more than the three (or five) mile limit tor fiscal and 

 defensive purposes. Doth Great Britain and the United States have 

 prohibited the transshipment within four leagues of their coast of for- 

 eign goods without payment of duties. 1 (Kent Com. I, p. 31.) 



In the case of Church v. Hubbart (2 Crunch, Rep. 287), the Supreme 

 Court of the United States unanimously held that "the right of a 

 nation to seize vessels attempting an illicit trade is not confined to their 

 harbors or to the range of their batteries. 1 ' It appeared in that case 

 that Portugal had prohibited trade with its colonies by foreigners. A 



1 Mr. Twiss says (vol. I, pp. 211, I'll', Int. Law) : "Further, if the free and common 

 use of a tiling which is incapahle of being appropriated were likely to be prejudicial 

 or dangerous to a nation, the care of its own safety would authorize it to reduce 

 that thing under its exclusive empire if possible, in order to restrict the use of it on 

 the part of others, by such precautions as prudence might dictate." 



Wildinan, on the same point, says (Int. Law, vol. i, p. 70): "The sea within gun- 

 shot of the shore is occupied by the occupation of the coast. Beyond this limit mar- 

 itime states have claimed a right of visitation and inquiry within those parts of the 

 ocean adjoining to their shores, which the common courtesy of nations had for their 

 common convenience allowed to lie considered as parts of their dominions for vari- 

 ous domestic purposes, and particularly for fiscal and defensive regulations more im- 

 mediately affecting their safety and welfare." 



Creasy (Int. Law, sec. 245) remarks: "States may exercise a qualified jurisdic- 

 tion over the seas near their coasts for more than the three (or five) miles limit, for 

 fiscal and defensive purposes, that is, for the purpose of enforcement of their 

 revenue laws, and in order to prevent foreign armed vessels from hovering on their 

 coasts in a. menacing and annoying manner." 



And Halleck says (Int. Law, chap. 6", sec. 13) the three-mile belt is the subject 

 of territorial jurisdiction. "Even beyond (his limit states may exercise a qualified 

 jurisdiction for fiscal and defensive purposes." 



