150 ARGUMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 



a Canadian vessel had been captured on the high sea by a United 

 States cruiser, and condemned by decree of the United States District 

 court, for violation of the regulations prescribed in those acts; and 

 it was claimed by the owners that the capture was unjustifiable, as 

 being an attempt to give effect to a municipal statute outside the 

 municipal jurisdiction. The case was dismissed because it was not 

 properly before the court. But in the opinion it is intimated that if 

 it had been necessary to decide the question the capture would have 

 been regarded as an executive act in defense of national interests, and 

 not as the enforcement of a statute beyond the limits of its effect. (Case 

 of the Saynard, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep., Book 36, U. S. Led., p. 179. 



As such defensive regulations, if the United States Government 

 thinks proper so to enforce them beyond the territorial line, the pro- 

 visions of those acts of Congress fulfill the conditions of being both 

 necessary and reasonable. They interfere in no respect with the free- 

 dom of the sea, except for the protection of the seal. And for the pur- 

 poses of that protection they are not only such as the Government 

 prescribes as against its own subjects, but are clearly shown by the 

 evidence to be necessary to be so enforced, in order to prevent the ex- 

 termination of the seals and its consequences to the United States. 



The decision in Church v. Ilubbart is cited as stating the law, by 

 Chancellor Kent (1 Com., 31) ; and also by Mr. Wharton ( I )ig\ Int. Law, 

 p. 113) and by Wheaton (Int. Law, 6th ed., p. 235). It was followed 

 in the same court by the case of Hudson v. Gnestier (0 Cranch Ren., 

 281). in which it was held that the jurisdiction of the French court as 

 to seizures is not confined to seizures made within two leagues of the 

 coast. And that a seizure beyond the limits of the territorial juris- 

 diction for breach of a municipal regulation is warranted by the law of 

 nations. 



This decision overruled a previous case (Rose v. Ilimely, 4 Cranch 

 Rep., 287) made, though upon very different facts, by a divided court. 

 The dissenting opinion of Johnson, J., in that case, which by the sub- 

 sequent decision became the law, is worthy of perusal. 1 



Mr. Dana, who published an edition of Wheaton, with notes which 

 so far as they were his own did not add to its value, is of opinion that 

 in the decision in Church v. Ilubbart, Chief Justice Marshall and his 

 eminent associates were mistaken. And this remark of his is cited 

 in the British Case. Mr. Dana has no such repute as makes him an 



' For opinion see Appendix, infra p. 182. 



